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ARTICLES
NO SHORTCUTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: BAIL
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIAL
CAROLINE L. DAVIDSON
It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.
Honoring the presumption of innocence is often difficult; sometimes we
must pay substantial social costs as a result of our commitment to the
values we espouse. But at the end of the day the presumption of
innocence protects the innocent; the shortcuts we take with those whom
we believe to be guilty injure only those wrongfully accused and,
ultimately, ourselves.1
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1. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 767 (1987) (Marshall J., dissenting)
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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INTRODUCTION2
Release at international tribunals has come a long way, and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has done
a lot right. Whereas defendants before the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals
were automatically detained and could not seek release,3 at the ICTY, pre2. Due to problems with publishing diacritics and accents, I have replaced all diacritics
and accented letters with the visually closest English letter. Also, in some instances, I have
retained the full citation to a case when a shortened citation would be appropriate so as to
retain identifying information that will help readers distinguish between cases and locate the
primary source. Occasionally, I have omitted extremely long URLs and instead I have
indicated the website where the source is available through a search engine.
3. See SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 84 (2003). It bears noting that these Tribunals operated before the enactment
of the major instruments codifying fundamental human rights.
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trial release and release during breaks from trial has become increasingly
common. Even at the ICTY‘s sister tribunal, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), provisional release lags behind, because only
three defendants have been released.4
Nevertheless, at the ICTY, detention remains the starting point, and all
defendants, other than those accused of contempt of court,5 are detained for
trial. The acquittal of eleven of the 121 defendants whose cases have been
completed, many after having spent several years in detention awaiting
judgment, makes default detention for trial a concern.6 These defendants
receive no compensation for their lost time.
Even for ICTY defendants who are released pre-trial because they pose
no flight risk or danger, detention is inevitable. Once trial begins, the best
they can hope for is to be released for court breaks or for short breaks due
to illness or some other such circumstance. Litigants and the court appear
to accept the baseline premise, with little or no discussion, that trial means
detention.
This state of affairs is idiosyncratic. Domestic jurisdictions do not draw
this stark line between pre-trial and trial for the purposes of release.
Human rights norms likewise draw no such line.
True, trials for genocide or crimes against humanity are not trials for
shoplifting. Courts and scholars have made much of the uniqueness of
international tribunals. They have argued that the gravity of the charges,
the complexity of the cases, the absence of an international police force,
and the absence of explicit penalties for failure to appear, among other
things, distinguish international criminal tribunals from domestic courts

4. Daniel J. Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR,
44 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 577, 577 (2003).
5. The court issued summons in lieu of arrest warrants for some journalists charged
with contempt for releasing confidential information. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hartmann,
Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Order in Lieu of an Indictment on Contempt,
¶ 3 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 27, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_hartmann/ind/en/080827.pdf; Prosecutor v. Marijacic
& Rebic, Case No. IT-95-14-R77.2, Decision on Review of Indictment (Int‘l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 26, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_marijacic_rebic/tdec/en/050426.htm.
6. See Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of International Criminal Tribunals in
Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 NW. U. J. INT‘L HUM. RTS. 1, 14 (2009),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v8/n1/1/ (noting that, according to data
provided by the United Nations Detention Unit (UNDU) in The Hague, as of October 31,
2008, the average time of detention before final conviction was five years, that several
defendants had been detained considerably longer, and that eleven alleged war criminals
have been acquitted by the ICTY after spending lengthy periods in detention). Proceedings
have concluded as to 125 ICTY defendants. See Key Figures of ICTY Cases,
http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last updated June 30, 2010).
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and render inapposite human rights jurisprudence on the reasonableness of
periods of detention.7
However, international trials are also unique in ways that favor release.
The accused are far from their families and support networks.8 At the
ICTY, defendants are also often considerably older and in worse health
than detainees in domestic jurisdictions.9 In addition, unlike in domestic
jurisdictions, many international defendants are not direct perpetrators of
the crimes, at least as the term is used in common parlance. Because they
are not the trigger-pullers but rather the higher ups, many are, arguably,
unlikely to be dangerous if released.10
But, most importantly, accused international defendants are detained for
very long periods of time. Trials are long.11 The ICTY has compounded
the scale of the already massive cases by joining many defendants in
widely varying roles in single cases.12 Detainees spend many years in
detention before their cases are resolved.13

7. See infra discussion accompanying notes 167–70 (noting the factors that many
argue distinguish international criminal tribunals from domestic jurisdictions).
8. See Hans Holthuis, Registrar, Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia,
Diplomatic Seminar of the Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague 3, 10
(June 2008) (on file with author) (stating that ―[i]n the case of the UNDU, its international
character and unique detainee population raise further difficulties in terms of health care.
Indeed, the particular profile and specific personal circumstances of ICTY detainees, being
in many instances former high ranked political and military leaders, can aggravate the
adverse impact of prison environment on their health. The distance from the detainees‘
family and the familial social support network, as well as the detainees‘ lack of familiarity
with the surroundings, inevitably impact on the health condition of the detainees.‖).
9. Id. at 3–7 (noting that at the UNDU, the average age of detainees was over twenty
years older than in domestic jurisdictions and that over eighty percent of those detained
were over the age of fifty).
10. One could argue, however, that even those who never held a gun may be likely to
present the very danger that landed them in the dock—fomenting ethnic tensions and
participating in crimes through policy-making.
11. See James Meernik & Rosa Aloisi, Is Justice Delayed at the International Criminal
Tribunals?, 91 JUDICATURE 276, 281 (2008) (stating that the average length of proceedings
for top-level political military leaders at the ICTY is 1406 days, 1181 days for mid-level
defendants and 950 days for low-level defendants); see also Stephanos Bibas & William W.
Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59
DUKE L.J. 637, 685 (2010) (noting that the average ICTY or ICTR case takes one and a half
years, millions of dollars, and hundreds of witnesses).
12. The International Tribunals have engaged to varying degrees in the practice of
joining several defendants and also several crimes and geographic areas into one trial. See
Laura Bingham, Strategy or Process? Closing the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 24 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 687, 706 (2006) (noting that the
ICTY has favored multi-defendant mega-trials as part of its completion strategy; whereas
the ICTR has focused on trial readiness with smaller cases, and the ICTR Prosecutor has in
fact sought to sever cases to bring them to trial sooner).
13. See Schomburg supra note 6, at 14 (―[T]he average time spent in pre-trial detention
was 511 days. The average time spent in detention during trial was 489 days. The average
time spent in detention while awaiting the finalization of appeal proceedings was 663
days.‖).
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Detention prior to conviction is a serious infringement on the rights of
defendants and has many real-life repercussions. Human rights implicated
by detention include the rights to be presumed innocent, to liberty, and to a
speedy and fair trial.14 As one Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada has
stated, ―[w]hen bail is denied to an individual who is merely accused of a
criminal offence, the presumption of innocence is necessarily infringed.‖15
Detention or release of accused international defendants also implicates
victims‘ rights to protection and, arguably, to participation in the criminal
process.
Beyond normative concerns about release, there are practical ones. One
of the likely explanations for the de facto ―detention during trial‖ regime of
the ICTY is the difficulty of sorting out an alternative plan. Whereas
defendants who pose no risk of flight or danger to the community in a
domestic jurisdiction can be released to their homes, defendants before the
ICTY have no homes in The Hague. Their homelessness poses both
strategic and practical problems for release. They are deprived of the
argument that their ties to the community reduce the risk of flight because,
of course, they have no ties. Further, there is the prosaic but real concern
about where to put defendants if they are released. Also, who pays for their
accommodations? How freely can they move about? Will the host country
permit defendants to live there when not detained?
Although the ICTY and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have
done their best to make conditions of pre-trial detention non-punitive, to
such an extent that the United Nations Detention Unit (UNDU) has been
described as the ―Hague Hilton,‖16 defendants are not at liberty. Moreover,
a report of the Registrar of the ICTY, prompted by deaths and two suicides
at the UNDU,17 contends that the exceptional length of the detention of
ICTY accused is more akin to stays at penal institutions in national

14. See Mark Findlay, Internationalised Criminal Trial and Access to Justice, 2 INT‘L
CRIM. L. REV. 237, 238 (2002).
15. R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64, ¶ 48 (Can.) (Iacobucci, J.,
dissenting).
16. See Doreen Carvajal, War Crimes Court Draws Criticism Over Travel Subsidies for
Visits, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at A6. The article also discusses the ICC‘s expensive
practice of flying defendants‘ families in for visits from the farthest corners of the earth as a
means of addressing their lengthy detention.
17. Slavko Dokmanovic committed suicide at the UNDU on June 29, 1998. Milan
Kovacevic and Slobodan Milosevic died of natural causes at the UNDU on August 1, 1998
and March 11, 2006, respectively. Milan Babic, who had been transferred to a domestic
jurisdiction to serve his sentence after pleading guilty, also committed suicide at the UNDU
on March 5, 2006. He had returned to The Hague to testify in Milan Martic‘s trial. See Key
Figures of ICTY Cases, INT‘L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last updated June 30, 2010).
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jurisdictions.18 It concluded that ―there is a very real and serious risk of a
life-threatening episode occurring at the UNDU at some time in the future
and without warning.‖19
A few scholars have written about provisional release at the ICTY and
ICTR in the context of pre-trial detention.20 However, the de facto regime
of detaining all defendants for trial has received little attention.21 This
Article seeks to fill this gap.
I attempt to offer a better framework for provisional release decisions
that applies both before and during international criminal trials. In Part I, I
explain why provisional release at international tribunals matters. I contend
that the foremost objective of international criminal tribunals should be to
promote respect for human rights and the rule of law.22 Focusing on the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)23 and domestic law, especially
18. Hans Holthuis, Registrar, In‘t Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Diplomatic
Seminar of the Int‘l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, at the Hague (June 10, 2008)
[hereinafter ICTY Registrar‘s Report]. The ICTY Registrar‘s Report was given in a
diplomatic seminar at the ICTY on June 10, 2008. See Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No.
IT-04-74-T, Decision on Slobodan Praljak‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 30–31 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 18, 2009).
19. ICTY Registrar‘s Report.
20. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald & Jenny Martinez, Provisional Release at the ICTY: A
Work in Progress, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 231, 236 (Richard May et
al. eds., 2001) (discussing concerns Trial Chamber decisions often raise when denying
release); Rearick, supra note 4, at 579 (discussing provisional release at the ICTR);
Matthew M. DeFrank, Commentary, ICTY Provisional Release: Current Practice, a
Dissenting Voice, and the Case for a Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1429–30 (2002)
(noting Judge Robinson‘s dissatisfaction with the current provisional release system).
21. At least one scholar has flagged the issue in passing. David Aronofsky contended
that it is ―inexplicable that international defendants who can afford bail and have nowhere to
flee are nonetheless not allowed bail while on trial.‖ See David Aronofsky, International
War Crimes & Other Criminal Courts: Ten Recommendations for Where We Go From
Here and How to Get There—Looking to a Permanent International Criminal Tribunal, 34
DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 17, 26 (2006). Aronofsky characterized the ―disregard for the
right to bail, accompanied by the parallel right to a quick bail hearing‖ as ―[o]ne of the great
travesties characterizing international criminal cases to date.‖ Id.
22. See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The
Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT‘L L. 39, 42 (2007) (―It would be ironic and counterproductive were
[international criminal law] trials to undermine some international human rights standards in
an effort to vindicate others.‖); see also Mirjan Damaska, What is the Point of International
Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 355–56 (2008) (noting that it would be ironic
if the judicial system disregarded humanistic values).
23. The ECtHR is charged with interpreting and enforcing the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which came into force on
September 3, 1953 and sets out the rights and freedoms that member states agree to ensure
to anyone in their jurisdiction. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; JEANFRANCOIS RENUCCI, INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
RIGHTS GUARANTEED AND THE PROTECTION MECHANISM 5 (2005). Prior to November 1998,
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that of the United States, I discuss the normative and functional reasons for
a more transparent and human rights protective provisional release regime.
The ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence is of particular interest because
judges of the ICTY and the ICC often cite them in their provisional release
decisions.24
In Part II, I explain why provisional release at the ICTY has failed to live
up to international human rights norms and focus on the de facto detention
for trial regime and the newly added ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian
circumstances‖ requirement for release after the close of the prosecution‘s
case. I focus on the ICTY, because, other than the ICC, it is the only
international tribunal to have released defendants at all and has the greatest
wealth of jurisprudence on provisional release.
Finally, in Part III, I evaluate alternative measures to address some of the
ICTY‘s human rights problems on provisional release, including
streamlining and possibly restructuring trials, revamping the risk of flight
and danger inquiry, compensating defendants for wrongful detention,
affording victims the right to participate in release decisions and, finally,
launching a concerted effort to eliminate the practical barriers to release.

the European Commission of Human Rights decided the admissibility of cases before the
ECHR. Since then, the two institutions have merged. The ECtHR issues decision binding
on member states and has provoked legislative changes in member states. European Court
of Human Rights, 50 Years of Activity: The European Court of Human Rights—Some Facts
and Figures 3 (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ACD46A0F-615A-48B989D6-8480AFCC29FD/0/FactsAndFiguresEN.pdf.
24. ICTY judges often turn to ECtHR jurisprudence for guidance, and yet are divided
on whether ECHR law binds the Tribunal due to the international nature of the Tribunal, the
gravity and complexity of the cases, and the like. E.g., Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic,
Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 46 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ademi,
Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 12 & n.8 (Int‘l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm; Prosecutor v. Delalic,
Mucic, Delic, & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release
filed by the Accused Zejnil Delalic, ¶¶ 21–26 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Sept. 25, 1996),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/60925PR2.htm; see also Prosecutor v. Bemba
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the Interim Release, ¶ 35 (Aug. 14, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc727230.pdf (noting that the ICC‘s rule on periodic
review of decisions on interim release must be interpreted and applied in accordance with
internationally recognized human rights and citing several international human rights
instruments).
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WHY PROVISIONAL RELEASE AT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS MATTERS
A. The Objectives of International Criminal Law

The purposes of international criminal law are many. International
criminal courts not only strive for general law enforcement goals such as
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, but also seek to
fulfill a myriad of goals unique to international criminal courts, including
producing ―a reliable historical record of the context of international
crime,‖ providing ―a venue for giving voice to international crime‘s many
victims,‖ spreading human rights values, developing international criminal
law, and promoting peace and security.25 All the while, of course, these
―objectives [are to] be pursued in proceedings solicitous of the rights of the
accused.‖26
Achieving all of these aims is a tall order. As Professor Damaska has
argued, international criminal law has suffered from there being too many
objectives and no hierarchy among them.27 This problem is rendered all
the more vexing in that these manifold objectives are often in tension with
one another.
Moreover, international criminal law has serious constraints in
accomplishing many of these goals in the first place. Although retributive
justice ―is the dominant stated objective for punishment of atrocity
perpetrators at the national and international levels,‖28 international
criminal tribunals have significant limitations in achieving retribution. The
inherent selectivity of tribunals, meaning their ability to prosecute only a
few perpetrators from but a few of the world‘s equally dire situations,
challenges the retributive aims because decisions on prosecution and
punishment ride on political or practical constraints rather than a
determination of the gravity of offenses and the just deserts of the world‘s
perpetrators of atrocities.29 Likewise, the disproportionality between the
severity of sanctions and the gravity of offenses,30 as well as the reliance of
25. Damaska, supra note 22, at 331.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 331–39 (listing numerous goals of international criminal courts and
addressing the tensions that arise due to the lack of harmony and failure to prioritize); see
also Sloane, supra note 22, at 45 (discussing the unduly high expectations of what
international criminal law can do and listing some of the oft-cited objectives).
28. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 150 (2007).
29. See id. at 151.
30. Id. at 154 (surveying national and international institutions and noting that
sentences for extraordinary international crimes typically are no longer than for ordinary
municipal crimes; sentences given by international tribunals likewise are no longer than
those generally given by national institutions; and, finally, within institutions, including the
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international tribunals on plea bargains, undermine the tribunals‘ retributive
function.31
Similarly, international tribunals also have limitations in deterring people
from committing atrocities.32 The prevailing wisdom on deterrence is that
deterrence depends on the existence of a high chance of prosecution and
prompt punishment, not on the severity of punishment.33 The reality that
only a tiny fraction of perpetrators will ever be prosecuted undermines the
deterrent effect of international criminal tribunals. Moreover, as Professor
Mark Drumbl notes, it is far from clear that would-be perpetrators of
atrocities are rational enough actors to be deterred by fear of punishment.34
The commission of major atrocities, such as the genocide at Srebrenica and
the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, well after the establishment of the ICTY do
little to bolster the effectiveness of international tribunals as mechanisms of
deterrence.35
The efficacy of international tribunals in achieving the goals more
specific to the international arena, such as creating a historical record and
promoting peace and security, is also debatable. Many argue that truth
commissions are a better means of creating a historical record than a
criminal trial, particularly one following the adversarial model.36 Criminal
trials, although useful in some contexts, likewise may not always be the
best way to promote peace and security. Trials may undermine transitional
justice aims by interfering with other tools, such as amnesty and political
solutions, to achieve peace.37
ICTY, there are sentencing disparities not explained by valid retributive goals, such as
differences in the gravity of the offenses).
31. Id. at 164 (arguing that, despite the many benefits of plea bargains, they ―compete
with the notion that perpetrators deserve to be punished‖ since plea bargains hinge on
factors other than the gravity of the offense, such as the willingness of the defendant to
cooperate, the information he or she has and institutional concerns).
32. See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice,
23 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 473, 474 (1999) (characterizing the deterrent effect of international
prosecutions as ―at best a plausible but largely untested assumption‖). But see Payam
Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?,
95 AM. J. INT‘L L. 7, 7 (2001) (arguing that international tribunals can have a deterrent effect
in the long run).
33. Id. at 169–70.
34. Id. at 171 (arguing that social pressures and a need to commit criminal acts in order
to survive may well prove more compelling than fear of criminal sanction).
35. DRUMBL, supra note 28, at 169.
36. E.g., Neha Jain, Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Prosecution and
Reconciliation: The Khmer Rouge Trials and the Promise of International Criminal Justice,
20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 247, 267 (2010); Ivan Simonovic, Comment, Attitudes and
Types of Reaction Toward Past War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, 29 YALE J. INT‘L L.
343, 349 (2004).
37. See Jain, supra note 36, at 267 (noting that unlike criminal trials, truth commissions
may provide a more accurate historical account of the causes and consequences of mass
violence); see also John Bolton, Speech Two: Reject and Oppose the International Criminal
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Empirical evidence appears to support this skepticism over the efficacy
of international criminal tribunals in achieving these special goals. For
example, Janine Clark‘s recent study based on interviews of people in
Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded that the ICTY did a poor job in
achieving the goals announced by its first President, Antonio Cassese,
which included dissipating calls for revenge, individualizing guilt,
establishing a historical record and contributing to reconciliation. 38 The
author concluded that, at worst, the ICTY has achieved none of these goals.
At best, the infrequency of revenge attacks suggested that the ICTY had
helped only in the first aim of reducing calls for vengeance by creating a
normative understanding that criminal trials, not vigilantism, are the way to
address past crimes.39
The law of provisional release at international criminal tribunals
demonstrates the need to identify and prioritize achievable objectives of
international criminal law.40 This decision on priorities will shape the
provisional release regime used. If the primary objective of tribunals is to
give victims a voice and to validate their suffering, then a very strict
detention regime may be appropriate—the presumption of innocence and
defendants‘ rights to liberty and a fair trial be damned. If human rights are
the top priority, then the detention regime may look somewhat different.
Easy or not, a number of scholars advocate prioritizing the goal of
encouraging respect for human rights through international criminal law.41
I agree. One view of international criminal tribunals is as penal institutions
geared at ―expressing‖ public condemnation of acts contrary to
international human rights and humanitarian law.42 According to this view,
the tribunals are a potential ―engine of jurisprudential development at the
Court, in TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? THREE OPTIONS PRESENTED AS
PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES 37, 48 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 1999) (providing that
truth commissions have a greater willingness to pardon offenders and that they may help
mitigate risks of future conflict).
38. Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, Findings of an Empirical
Study in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 463, 464 (2009).
39. Id. at 471.
40. See Damaska, supra note 22, at 355–56 (discussing the relationship between
deterrence and culpability in an effort to determine the proper sentence to impose and
doctrine to follow).
41. See CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 46 (2001) (―The main rationale for international criminal law is . . . the
protection and promotion of human rights in the global society.‖).
42. See DRUMBL, supra note 28, at 173 (labeling this conception of international
criminal justice ―expressivism‖); Damaska, supra note 22, at 343 (presenting a similar
vision, which he terms a ―didactic‖ model); Sloane, supra note 22, at 42, 44 (labeling the
conception ―expressivism‖); see also Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization through
Trials for Violations of International Law: Four Conditions for Success and Their
Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. INT‘L L. 427, 430 n.6
(2009) (using the term ―norm internalization‖).
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local level,‖ which can encourage ―the legal and normative internalization
of international human rights and humanitarian law.‖43 Janine Clark‘s
empirical study lends credence to this view of international criminal law.
Still, promoting norms condemning genocide and the like through
punishment of norm violators must be done in a manner consistent with the
overall human rights promotion agenda.44 As Robert Sloane argues, ―[i]t
would be ironic and counterproductive were [international criminal law]
trials to undermine some international human rights standards in an effort
to vindicate others.‖45 German scholar Christoph Safferling concludes the
same, stating, ―[h]uman rights can only be protected through human rights.
If human rights are to be protected via criminal prosecution, the applied
system must itself be strictly compatible with human rights.‖46 This respect
for human rights also serves transitional justice needs by increasing not
only actual fairness, but also the appearance of fairness, and by promoting
respect for the rule of law.47
The interconnected transnational world in which tribunals operate makes
this goal of human rights promotion all the more important. Judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys return to their home countries armed
with knowledge acquired at the international tribunals.48 The need to
respect the human rights of defendants should be first and foremost among
the lessons they carry with them. Indeed, there is already evidence that

43. Sloane, supra note 22, at 44.
44. See id. (―[I]nternational human rights law requires that the deterrent or retributive
goals to which a focus on the expressive capacity of punishment may contribute be
tempered and constrained by considerations of due process, rehabilitation, proportionality,
and justice.‖).
45. Id. at 42.
46. See SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 46, 48 (―[A] human rights enforcement system
that is itself not compatible with human rights loses a great deal of impact and
persuasiveness. How should one generally rely on and trust in a system that is meant to
protect human rights but is intrinsically at odds with them? . . . The protection of human
rights by using criminal law at an international level can only be effective if it is done with
respect for human rights.‖).
47. See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 30 (2000) (―For trials to realize their
constructive potential, they need to be prosecuted in keeping with the full legality associated
with working democracies during ordinary times, and when they are not conducted in a
visibly fair way, the very same trials can backfire, risking the wrong message of political
justice and threatening a fledgling liberal state. Accordingly, successor trials walk a
remarkably thin line between the fulfillment of the potential for a renewed adherence to the
rule of law and the risk of perpetuating political justice.‖); see also Sonja B. Starr,
Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in International Courts, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 693, 713 (2008) (arguing that perceived fairness is critical to transitional justice).
48. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal
Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1015 (2007) (discussing transnational networks among
judges, prosecutors, and investigators and stating that ―[s]ome judges carry lessons learned
at international tribunals back to their domestic courts‖).
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domestic jurisdictions are using ICTY procedural rules and case law for
guidance.49
Moreover, international procedural rules often migrate from international
criminal courts to hybrid tribunals50 and eventually to domestic
jurisdictions. Among the oft-cited benefits of hybrid tribunals are
increasing the affected region‘s respect for the rule of law and trust in
public institutions and building local capacity through collaboration with
international lawyers.51
If criminal procedures trickle down from
international tribunals to hybrid courts and hybrid courts to national courts,
then an international provisional release law that fails to live up to
international human rights norms may prove problematic. Releaseunfriendly precedent of the ad hoc tribunals may be justifiable in the
particular circumstances of international criminal tribunals, but less so in
domestic courts. It is far from clear that national jurisdictions will resist
the temptation to import exceptional international criminal procedures
despite the absence of these justifications, particularly if the international
court is not clear about the reasons for its decisions.52
The same concern about setting a bad example for domestic jurisdictions
and disseminating human rights-unfriendly laws arises under the
framework of the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute). The ICC,
whose jurisdiction is ―complementary‖ and not ―primary,‖ is premised on
decentralization—the notion that most states are investigating and trying
cases locally.53 If countries model their war crimes legislation and
jurisprudence on those of international tribunals, the exceptional
provisional release regimes of international tribunals may be imported into
domestic law. This importation and possible dilution of the protections of
domestic law may not be a good thing.
49. See Starr, supra note 47, at 714 & n.92 (citing examples from Germany, Ireland,
Canada, and South Africa and noting that the procedures of the Iraqi Special Tribunal that
tried Saddam Hussein were modeled on those of the ICTY and the ICTR).
50. Hybrid tribunals are courts created, often by the United Nations, in cooperation with
national governments that meld international and domestic legal approaches. See Bibas &
Burke-White, supra note 11, at 639 (listing Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Cambodia, East Timor,
and Bosnia as examples of hybrid tribunals).
51. See, e.g., James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War
Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 616, 659 (2005) (listing various ―legacies‖ that
hybrid tribunals create in the countries in which they operate); Laura A. Dickinson, Note,
The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 295, 305–06 (2003) (discussing the
advantages of hybrid tribunals).
52. See Starr, supra note 47, at 744–45 (discussing the danger of the opacity in
international judicial decisions in reference to its effect on the understanding of international
human rights obligations at the national level).
53. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV.
INT‘L L.J. 53, 56 (2008) (labeling the practice ―passive complementarity‖).
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The question then becomes what provisional release regime best
promotes human rights? A defendant‘s rights-protective provisional
release regime arguably encourages human rights norms such as the rights
to be free from arbitrary detention, to a fair trial, to the presumption of
innocence, to a speedy trial, and the like. By freeing a defendant pending
final judgment, the international tribunal expresses a high value, to use
Sloane‘s language, for these human rights norms.54
However, some argue that releasing people accused of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes undermines human rights by trivializing
those offenses and the related human rights norms of right to life, security
of person, and others.55 In essence, by letting a defendant roam the streets
while accused of such serious crimes, the court expresses a view that these
crimes are no more serious than any garden-variety domestic crime, and
undermines the expressive function of the prosecution.
There is a risk that letting defendants out on provisional release for
serious international crimes will create this impression, but the risk can be
mitigated by other mechanisms showing that the tribunals take these crimes
very seriously. The most obvious means of doing this is through
sentencing. Once a defendant is convicted, his or her sentence should
reflect the gravity of the crimes.56 Moreover, outreach can be aimed at
explaining why defendants are released, the presumption of innocence, and
defendants‘ rights, while affirming the gravity of the crimes charged.
Trying to achieve these expressive aims before a defendant is convicted
puts the cart before the horse and unnecessarily undermines other important
human rights norms.
B. Human Rights Implicated by Provisional Release Decisions
International human rights law does not recognize a right to bail or
release pending trial. Rather, it recognizes the right to have a court decide
the lawfulness of a defendant‘s detention promptly after arrest.57 Detention
54. Sloane, supra note 22, at 69–70 (arguing for recognition of the expressive function
of international criminal proceedings).
55. See infra notes 267–268 (discussing whether to release defendants for court breaks).
56. See Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary
Crimes, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 683, 688–89 (2007) (arguing that sentences at the ICTY have
been too lenient and advocating for the introduction of sentencing guidelines).
57. The ICCPR provides, ―Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not
lawful.‖ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. III, art. 9(4), opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Prosecutor v.
Norman, Fofana, & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR65, Appeal Against Decision
Refusing Bail, ¶ 32 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 11, 2005),
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=gcYjozQ1q9U%3d&tabid=193 (stating that
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and release of international criminal defendants also implicates a number of
core human rights, including the presumption of innocence, the rights to
liberty and to be free from arbitrary detention, and to a speedy and fair trial.
Detention and release also affect victims‘ rights.
Decisions about detention and release bring to the fore a key question
about the relationship between international criminal law and human rights
law—do the international human rights norms apply in the context of an
international criminal trial? I contend that whether or not international
human rights instruments technically bind international tribunals, the
tribunals should seek to uphold them in order to achieve their objective of
promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law.
1.

Presumption of innocence
All major international human rights instruments58 and the statutes of the
ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC proclaim the presumption of innocence.59
For example, Article 6(2) of the ECHR enshrines the presumption of
innocence: ―Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.‖60
According to one leading international criminal law scholar, the
presumption has three major implications:
(i) the person charged with a crime must be treated . . . as being innocent
until proved guilty; (ii) the burden of proof, that the accused is guilty of
the crimes with which he is charged, is on the Prosecutor; the defendant
may limit himself to rebutting the evidence produced by the Prosecutor,
but does not have to prove his innocence; (iii) in order to find the
accused guilty of the crimes charged, the court must be convinced of his
guilt according to a certain standard of proof, which in civil law
the ―right to bail‖ is a ―right to apply for bail‖ after which the court can determine whether
pre-trial detention is necessary).
58. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 235, 254–55 (1993) (citing several human rights conventions and
noting that sixty-seven national constitutions also provide for the presumption of
innocence).
59. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 66(1), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm; Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 20(3), U.N. Doc S/RES/955 (Oct. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 21(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute], available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf;
see
also
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 390 (2003) (providing that major
national legal systems follow the principle of the ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute, and Rome
Statute and presume innocence).
60. ECHR, supra note 23, art. 6(2).
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countries is normally [the judge‘s innermost conviction] whereas in
common law countries it is ―finding the accused guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.‖61

To the extent one believes that the presumption of innocence applies
more broadly than just to the burden of proof at trial, provisional release
decisions arguably implicate all three aspects of the presumption. Indeed,
discussion of the presumption of innocence appears most frequently in
international tribunals in the context of provisional release.62
Regarding the first implication—that the person charged with a crime
must be treated as being innocent until proven guilty—the significance for
provisional release is that innocent people should not be detained absent
strict justifications.63 Moreover, as the ECtHR has stated, ―the gravity of
61. CASSESE, supra note 59, at 390; see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 85 (listing three
main consequences of the presumption of innocence). However, not all domestic
jurisdictions agree on the scope of the presumption of innocence. Both the United States
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada have noted the link between the
presumption of innocence and bail, but the United States Supreme Court increasingly
appears to have adopted a restrictive interpretation of the presumption of innocence as
allocating the burden of proof at trial and having ―no application to a determination of the
rights of a pre-trial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.‖ Compare
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (stating ―[t]he presumption of innocence is a
doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials . . . [b]ut it has no application to
a determination of the rights of a pre-trial detainee during confinement before his trial has
even begun‖ in a case relating to conditions of detention), with Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4
(1951) (stating ―[u]nless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of
innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning‖). It bears
noting that Bell dealt with a class action suit about conditions of confinement for pre-trial
detainees, not ―with the initial decision to detain an accused and the curtailment of liberty
that such a decision necessarily entails.‖ Bell, 441 U.S. at 533–34; see also NICO STEYTLER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996 134 (1998) (contending that the right to bail does not
stem from the presumption of innocence). By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has
noted: ―it is generally accepted and acknowledged that the denial of bail has a detrimental
effect on the presumption of innocence and liberty rights of the accused . . . .‖ R. v. Hall,
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64, ¶ 59 (Can.); see also R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665,
¶ 24 (Can.) (stating that ―the presumption of innocence is an animating principle throughout
the criminal justice process. The fact that it comes to be applied it its strict evidentiary
sense at trial pursuant to s. 11(d) of the Charter, in no way diminishes the broader principle
of fundamental justice that the starting point for any proposed deprivation of life, liberty or
security of the person of anyone charged with or suspected of an offence must be that the
person is innocent‖); Francois Quintard-Morenas, The Presumption of Innocence in the
French and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 107, 149 (2010) (noting
that the French conception of the presumption of innocence is as ―a rule of proof casting on
the prosecution the burden of proving guilt [as well as] a shield that prevents the infliction
of punishment prior to conviction;‖ whereas ―Anglo-American jurisdictions tend to view the
doctrine as a mere rule of proof without effect before trial‖).
62. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 517 (2006).
63. See ECHR, supra note 23, art. 5(1) (delineating reasons for lawful deprivation of
liberty); see also SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 134 (stating that ―[s]een in terms of the
presumption of innocence, the legitimacy of pre-trial detention [is] called in question, as it
can be defined as the detention of an innocent‖). Judge Pettiti in W. v. Switzerland offered

CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1

16

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

the charges cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of detention on
remand.‖64 Nor can detention be used to ―anticipate the sentence‖ or
reflect the judge‘s feeling or opinions as regards the accused‘s guilt. 65 Also
related to this aspect of the presumption of innocence is the notion
embodied in Article 9(3) of the ICCPR that ―[i]t shall not be the general
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody.‖66
Regarding the second implication of the presumption of innocence—the
allocation of burden of proof—the significance for provisional release is
less clear. On the one hand, the decision whether or not to detain a person
is not a final decision on the merits of the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. However, to the extent one ties the possibility of release to the
likelihood that the defendant committed the offense,67 arguably the
presumption of innocence requires that the defendant not have to prove his
or her innocence to get released. A stronger formulation is that the
defendant should not bear the burden of proving anything, including the
absence of flight risk or danger for the provisional release inquiry.68
an even more defendant-friendly interpretation of the presumption. He contended that it
also is to ―mak[e] it possible for a defendant to cope with his position as an accused until his
trial. As an extreme case, a person who knows he is guilty must be able, by remaining at
liberty after being charged, to orientate his professional and family life and make
arrangements for the future.‖ W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5, 22 (1993)
(Pettiti, J., dissenting).
64. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for
Provisional Release During the Court‘s Winter Recess, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/081217.pdf (quoting Ilijkov v. Bulgaria,
[citation omitted]); see also Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT,
Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 46 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 26,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf
(stating that the ECtHR has held that the gravity of the charges is not sufficient justification
for long periods of detention on remand); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case
No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision on Ramush Haradinaj‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 24
(Int‘l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
June
6,
2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/050606.htm (same); Prosecutor v. Franko
Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-AR65.2, Decision on Prosecution‘s Appeal Against Decision
on Provisional Release, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 3, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/acdec/en/041203sim.htm.
65. See Smirnova v. Russia, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, 249; Tomasi v. France, App.
No. 12850/87, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 51 (1992); Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 21, ¶ 51 (1991) (same).
66. SCHABAS, supra note 62, at 517. Safferling contends that the requirement that
liberty be the general rule and jail the exception is the ―logical and consistent adaptation of
the principle of presumption of innocence to the pre-trial stage.‖ SAFFERLING, supra note
41, at 135. In juxtaposition to the old rule at the ad hoc tribunals requiring ―exceptional
circumstances‖ to justify release, Safferling argues that ―[o]nly under exceptional
circumstances may a suspect be detained; otherwise he must remain free.‖ Id.
67. See SCHABAS, supra note 62, at 517.
68. See, e.g., ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 85 (stating that the prosecutor should bear the
burden of proof).
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The ECtHR has stated that the burden of proof must be on the
prosecution, not the defense, to establish grounds for detention, since
―[s]hifting the burden of proof to the detained person in such matters is
tantamount to overturning the rule of Article 5 of the [ECHR], a provision
which makes detention an exceptional departure from the right to liberty
and one that is only permissible in exhaustively and strictly defined
cases.‖69 Although, as Patricia Wald and Jenny Martinez note, it is
common for domestic jurisdictions to have presumptions of risk or danger
when a defendant is accused of certain serious offenses,70 and international
crimes are undoubtedly extremely serious offenses,71 these presumptions
are rebuttable, and the prosecution typically still bears the burden of
persuading the court that the defendant is a risk of flight or danger.72
Presumption of innocence notwithstanding, some domestic courts appear
to allow the strength of a case against an accused to be factored into the
provisional release decision. In the United States federal system, in certain
serious cases where there is a presumption of risk of flight or danger, ―the
weight of the evidence‖ is one of the factors a judge is to take into account
in deciding release.73
Similarly, in Canada, the strength of the

69. Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 85 (2001).
70. WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 234 n.11; see also R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3
S.C.R. 665, ¶ 33 (Can.) (upholding a law placing the burden on those charged with drug
trafficking to show why they should not be detained).
71. WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 234.
72. The ECtHR has not banned presumptions of risks of flight or danger altogether, but
it limits them by stating, ―[w]here the law provides for a presumption in respect of factors
relevant to the grounds for continued detention, the existence of concrete facts outweighing
the rule of respect for individual liberty must be nevertheless convincingly demonstrated.‖
Ilijkov, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84 (2001) (internal citations omitted). In Ilijkov, the ECtHR
found a violation of the ECHR in a case where Bulgarian courts failed to examine the
circumstances that may have weighed against the danger that the accused would abscond or
collude with others based on a strict presumption of detention that was ―only rebuttable in
very exceptional circumstances where even a hypothetical possibility of absconding, reoffending or collusion was excluded due to serious illness or other exceptional factors.‖ Id.
at ¶ 83. Likewise, in the United States federal system, even in certain serious cases where
there is a presumption of flight or danger, the defendant only bears the burden of producing
evidence—not of persuading the fact-finder—that he does not pose a danger to the
community or risk of flight. The burden of persuasion remains on the government to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is dangerous or by a preponderance of
the evidence that he or she poses a flight risk. United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436
(2d
Cir.
2001);
see
also
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (2006) (requiring the government to prove that the defendant
poses a serious risk of obstruction of justice). But see R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, ¶
33 (Can.) (holding that it did not violate the presumption of innocence for the defendant to
bear burden of showing why he or she should be released).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2); see also Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventive Detention: A
Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices in the United States, England, Canada and Other
Common Law Nations, 8 PACE INT‘L L. REV. 399, 410 n.60 (1996) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(g)).
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prosecution‘s case can be relevant to the release inquiry.74 By contrast,
ECtHR jurisprudence makes reasonable suspicion a sine qua non for
detention, but the case for detention does not vary depending on the
strength of the evidence against the accused. Likewise, in the United
Kingdom, the likelihood of conviction has been deemed irrelevant to the
bail inquiry since 1976.75
Finally, the third implication of the presumption of innocence—the
standard of proof— begs the question how much the standard of proof on
release factors, particularly if one such factor is the likelihood of
conviction, can deviate from the ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ or
―innermost conviction of the judge‖ standard ultimately used to assess guilt
or innocence. At the ICTY, the defense bears the burden of proving, on a
balance of probabilities, that the accused will appear for trial and will not
pose a danger if released.76
Despite the scholarly debate on when the presumption should kick in,77
there is little discussion whether the presumption abates as damning
evidence comes in. If the presumption is strongest against those who have
not been indicted, is it weaker against those against whom more than a
prima facie case exists? The language of the international criminal statutes,
human rights instruments, and ECtHR cases suggests otherwise. One is
presumed innocent until conviction.78 Nevertheless, as discussed below,
the ICTY‘s heightened release standard after the prosecution has rested
raises the possible inference that courts view the presumption of innocence
as weakening as more evidence comes in against an accused, even if they
74. See R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, 2002 SCC 64, ¶ 40 (Can.) (applying four
factors set out in Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46 § 515(10)(c), used to
determine whether bail can be denied).
75. See Metzmeier, supra note 73, at 413–15 (explaining the English system of bail).
76. E.g., Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion
for Provisional Release, ¶ 12 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/100331.pdf.
77. Compare ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 84 (advocating the early application of the
presumption at least as of investigation), and C. Van den Wyngaert, Criminal Procedure in
Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 15 (C. Van den
Wyngaert, ed., 1993) (stating that Article 6(2) of the ECHR on the presumption of
innocence is applicable throughout all stages of the proceedings), with SAFFERLING, supra
note 41, at 67 (questioning whether the presumption of innocence is even applicable pretrial).
78. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. III, art. 14(2),
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (―Everyone charged with a criminal
offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.‖);
Neumeister v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37, ¶ 4 (1968) (discussing Article 5(3) of
the ECHR and stating ―[u]ntil conviction, [an accused] must be presumed innocent, and the
purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release
once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable‖); ICTY Statute, supra note 59, art.
21(3) (―The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the
provisions of the present Statute.‖).
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seek to characterize the relevance of the evidence as the increased flight
risk of the defendant.79
ICTY judges appear to consider the presumption relevant to the
provisional release inquiry, but not determinative. As ICTY Judge
Robinson noted in Prosecutor v. Jokic,80 ―as a general rule, a decision to
release an accused should be based on an assessment of whether public
interest requirements, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence,
outweigh the need to ensure, for an accused, respect to the right to liberty
of person.‖81 Another chamber has noted that ICTY jurisprudence
considers the presumption of innocence not to be determinative on the issue
of release ―since otherwise . . . ‗no accused would ever be detained, as all
are presumed innocent.‘‖82
2.

The right to liberty and security of the person
Detention or arrest is also a ―severe infringement of the right to liberty
and security of person‖ guaranteed in Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5
of the ECHR.83 Article 9 of the ICCPR also forbids ―arbitrary arrest or
detention.‖84
Of course, these rights are not absolute. The guarantee that ―[n]o one
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law‖85 makes clear that some
grounds for detaining people exist, notwithstanding the right, and the issue
is over the legality of the grounds on which they are detained and the
79. See infra Part II.C.
80. Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Order on Motions for Provisional Release, ¶ 20 (Int‘l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002).
81. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the
Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic, ¶ 14 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm
(―The Trial Chamber has carefully balanced two main factors, namely the public interest,
including the interest of the victims and witnesses who have agreed to co-operate with the
Prosecution, and the right of all detainees to be treated in a humane manner in accordance
with the fundamental principles of respect for their inherent dignity and of the presumption
of innocence.‖).
82. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic et al., Case No. IT-05-87-AR65.2, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal of Denial of Provisional Release During the Winter Recess, ¶ 12 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 2006). At least one ICTY Trial Chamber
has found that ―there is no right of an accused to provisional release during the court recess
derived from the presumption of innocence; rather, subject to the requirements of Rule
65(B) being met, it is based on judicial discretion.‖ Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-0481-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for Provisional Release During the Court‘s Winter
Recess, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/081217.pdf.
83. SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 133.
84. ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 9(1).
85. Id.
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procedures allowing for detention. As noted below, the ECtHR demands
that ―a genuine public requirement of public interest‖ outweigh the
individual‘s liberty interest.86
Domestic jurisdictions also require a balancing of the right of the
individual to liberty against the interests of the state in provisional release
decisions. The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Canada have held that the government can constitutionally restrict a
person‘s liberty if there is a permissive regulatory purpose, such as
ensuring the defendant‘s presence at trial or ―preventing danger to the
community,‖ and the measure is not excessive.87 In Germany, the notion is
that detention requires justification because it deprives a person of his right
to freedom of movement.88 If the needs of society outweigh the rights of
the defendant, the defendant, though presumed innocent, must make a
―‗special sacrifice‘ (Sonderopfer)‖ for the good of the community.89
Although the interests of the state may outweigh those of a detainee in
certain circumstances, judges should not have boundless discretion in
detaining criminal defendants. In Schiesser v. Switzerland,90 the ECtHR
held that, to comport with Article 5(3), the official determining release or
detention must ―review[] the circumstances militating for or against
detention, [and] decid[e], by reference to legal criteria, whether there are
reasons to justify detention and . . . order[] release if there are no such
reasons.‖91 Likewise, in upholding the Bail Reform Act‘s provision
allowing for detention based on danger to the community, the United States
Supreme Court found it significant that the provision did not give ―[t]he
judicial officer . . . unbridled discretion in making the detention
determination‖ since ―Congress ha[d] specified the considerations relevant
to that decision.‖92 The Supreme Court of Canada struck down provisional
release provisions that gave courts too much discretion on the basis that
86. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744 (1987); see also R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3
S.C.R. 665, ¶ 4 (Can.) (upholding the bail act‘s presumption of detention in drug
distribution cases based on the narrowness of the circumstances that justified detention and
the finding that detention was necessary for the proper functioning of the bail system).
88. SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 134 (―Detention means that the suspect is deprived of
his right to freedom of movement (outside his cell) for the duration of detention. It is not
merely a violation of the human rights to liberty, but a temporary destruction of this right.‖).
89. Id.
90. 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14, ¶ 31 (1979)
91. Id.; see also Skoogstrom v. Sweden, 83 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, ¶¶ 82–83
(1984) (noting that the breadth of Sweden‘s public prosecutor‘s discretion in deciding
release might not meet the ―by reference to legal criteria‖ requirement).
92. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742. The factors included ―the nature and seriousness of the
charges, the substantiality of the
Government‘s evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee‘s background and characteristics,
and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect‘s release.‖ Id. at 742–43.
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―[a]ny bail provision that confers open-ended judicial discretion to refuse
bail is unconstitutional, and it is a fundamental principle of justice that an
individual cannot be detained by virtue of a vague legal provision.‖93
Both the ICCPR and the ECHR provide that those who have been
unlawfully arrested or detained have an enforceable right to
compensation.94 Likewise, many European jurisdictions provide for
compensation for unlawful detention.95 Some European jurisdictions even
provide compensation to criminal defendants who are acquitted, even if
their detention was lawful.96 By contrast, public compensation for
detention is uncommon in the United States, and tort actions for malicious
prosecution or false imprisonment are unlikely to succeed.97
3.

The right to a speedy trial
Although the right to a speedy trial is tied to the right to be free from
arbitrary detention and the presumption of innocence, it has also been
recognized as a human right ―found to be basic to fairness in the criminal
process,‖ both as part of the concept of due process and ―as a separate,
indentifiable [sic] right.‖98
Significantly for provisional release, the ICCPR and the ECHR provide
that the remedy for failure to decide charges expeditiously is release. For
example, Article 5(3) of the ECHR provides:
Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 1.c of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be
93. R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, ¶ 12, 2002 SCC 64 (Can.). The Supreme Court of
Canada has struck down provisions allowing courts to deny bail when it was ―necessary in
the public interest,‖ R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711, ¶ 4 (Can.), and ―on any other just
cause being shown‖ as unconstitutionally vague, R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, ¶ 18
(Can.). As the court stated in R. v. Pearson, ―discretion is arbitrary if there are no criteria,
express or implied, which govern its exercise . . . . Thus, detention is arbitrary if it is
governed by unstructured discretion.‖ [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, ¶ 70 (Can.) (quoting R. v.
Hufsky, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 621, ¶ 5 (Can.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. See ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 9(5) (―Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.‖); ECHR, supra note 23,
art. 5(5) (―Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.‖).
95. See Richard S. Frase, Main-Streaming Comparative Criminal Justice: How to
Incorporate Comparative and International Concepts and Materials into Basic Criminal
Law and Procedure Courses, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 773, 782 (1998) (citing various European
codes requiring compensation be paid to defendants held in pretrial detention but never
convicted).
96. See Johan David Michels, Compensating Acquitted Defendants For Detention
Before International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 407, 409 n.6 (2010) (listing
Norway, Sweden, Demark, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland, Italy and Latvia,
among others, as countries providing compensation).
97. Frase, supra, note 95, at 782.
98. Bassiouni, supra note 58, at 253, 274.
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entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.
Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.99

The ICCPR provision is almost identical.100 The United States views the
right to be tried within a reasonable time in speedy trial terms and envisions
an even more drastic remedy, dismissal of the charges with prejudice, as
the ordinary remedy for the violation of this right.101
Article 5(3) has been the focal point of ECtHR cases where litigants
claim that their governments have violated their rights under the ECHR
based on excessive detention prior to a final judgment. The ECtHR has
held that Article 5(3)‘s right to be tried within a reasonable time or to be
released applies ―until the day of the judgment that terminates the trial.‖102
The ECtHR engages in a three-step analysis to assess the legitimacy of
detention under Article 5(3). The inquiry under the ECHR is first, whether
there is reasonable suspicion that a suspect has committed a crime to
support the detention.103 Even if there is reasonable suspicion, continued
detention is not acceptable unless the government shows ―relevant‖ and
―sufficient‖ grounds to justify the detention.104 Even then, detention may
become unreasonable under Article 5(3) if authorities fail to act with
―special diligence‖ or if the proceedings go on too long.105
To determine whether detention on remand (or denial of release) is
permissible, despite the right to liberty and the presumption of innocence,
the ECtHR uses a balancing test:
―Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are
specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which,
notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of
99. ECHR, supra note 23, art. 5(3) (emphasis added).
100. See ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 9(3) (―Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It
shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but
release may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement.‖).
101. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439–40 (1973) (contemplating
alternative remedies, but concluding that dismissal must remain ―the only possible
remedy‖).
102. Wemhoff v. Germany, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23, ¶ 7 (1968).
103. See Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 49–50 (1982)
(holding that France had violated Tomasi‘s rights under Article 5(3) of the ECHR).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 50; see also Debboub alias Husseini Ali v. France, App. No. 37786/97,
33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1302, 1314 (2001) (acknowledging the complexity of the case but finding
that the French courts had not acted with the necessary dispatch); Wemhoff,
7 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26 (noting that Article 5(3) may be violated if proceedings go on too long
even if a person is otherwise reasonably detained, but finding, in the very same case, that the
exceptional length of the investigation and the trial, a total of three years, were justified due
to the exceptional complexity of the case).

CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1

2010]

NO SHORTCUTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

23

respect for individual liberty.‖106 The ECtHR has recognized four
permissible grounds for refusing provisional release—the risk that, if
released, the defendant ―will fail to appear at trial,‖ ―take action to
prejudice the administration of justice,‖ commit further crimes, or ―cause
public disorder.‖107 Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has held
that detaining criminal defendants based on risk of flight or danger to the
community does not offend any constitutional rights to liberty, due process,
or bail.108 As discussed below in Parts II and III, the ICTY rules have tied
release to two of these grounds—risk of flight and danger—and the ICC
rules to three—risk of flight, further offenses, and the obstruction of
justice.109
In addition to the guarantee of Article 5(3) discussed above in Part I.B.3,
Article 6(1) of the ECHR provides: ―In the determination of his civil rights
and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled
to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.‖110 This right applies whether or not
the defendant is detained. The ECtHR interprets the right to speedy trial to
include the right for one‘s trial to be completed expeditiously, not just that
trial begins within a reasonable time.111

106. W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1993).
107. Smirnova v. Russia, App. Nos. 46138/99 and 48183/99, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 450, 461
(2004).
108. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 739 (1987). At the time of Salerno,
detaining criminal defendants based on future danger was highly controversial and drew
vigorous dissents. In particular, Justice Marshall argued that it violated the presumption of
innocence. Id. at 762–63 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also DANIEL RICHMAN, United
States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory Detention, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STORIES 413, 413, 439 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (noting the controversy over the future
danger ground and that it has since died down); Paul H. Robinson, Punishing
Dangerousness:
Cloaking
Preventive
Detention
as
Criminal
Justice,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1454 (2001) (arguing that prevention and justice ought to be
separated).
109. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), a Cambodian
court with international participation set up to address the crimes of the Khmer Rouge
regime, relies upon the fourth ground for detention, preservation of the ―public order,‖
which I discuss in another work in progress. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia Internal Rules, Rule 63(3) (Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter ECCC Rules], available at
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/fileUpload/121/IRv5-EN.pdf. See generally About
Extraordinary
Chambers
in
the
Courts
of
Cambodia:
Introduction,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/about_eccc.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
110. ECHR, supra note 23, art. 6(1).
111. Wemhoff v. Germany, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1968) (resolving an ambiguity
in the English text of the ECHR and holding that Article 5(3)‘s right to be tried within a
reasonable time or to be released applies ―until the day of the judgement that terminates the
trial‖).
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4.

The right to a fair trial
The right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is one of the core human
rights guaranteed in international human rights instruments, including the
ICCPR, the ECHR and others.112 It encompasses a variety of procedural
concepts, such as a defendant‘s right to have his or her case adjudicated by
an impartial court.113 In addition, it includes moral concepts, such as the
presumption of innocence, right to liberty, and security of the person,
which are discussed above.114 It also includes the right for a defendant to
be allowed a fair opportunity to defend himself or herself against
charges.115
As scholars, the ECtHR, and the Supreme Court of Canada have noted,
detention on remand also presents a number of difficulties for defendants,
including interfering with defense preparation, economic hardship, and
pressure to plead guilty.116 Empirical studies suggest that ―the longer a
person spends time in pretrial detention, the more likely she will be
convicted.‖117

112. SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 29.
113. Id. at 30.
114. Id. at 30–31 (―[T]he texts of the human rights treaties, Art. 14 ICCPR in particular,
[make clear] that ‗fair trial‘ does not comprise one peculiar right. It consists of a whole
range of different rights and obligations. Nevertheless it is one concept: how to make a trial
‗fair.‘‖).
115. See Salov v. Ukraine, 2005-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 143, 169 (―Article 6 of the
Convention, read as a whole, guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in
a criminal trial. It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal
proceedings, including the elements of such proceedings which relate to procedure, should
be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and
defence. In deciding whether there has been a violation of Article 6, the Court must
consider whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the appeal proceedings, as well
as the way in which evidence was taken, were fair.‖ (internal citations omitted)).
116. See, e.g., R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, ¶ 59, 2002 SCC 64 (Can.) (Iacobucci, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Packer and noting that a Toronto empirical study conducted by
Professor Friedland had demonstrated these prejudicial effects); W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1993) (Pettiti, J., dissenting) (noting that the ―perverse effects of
prolonged pre-trial detention‖ include the transformation of an ―investigation into a coercion
to confess or a punishment for refusing to accuse oneself‖ and the harm to a defendant‘s
well-being which has led to suicides or early deaths due to illness); id. at 27 (Walsh, J., and
Loizou, J., dissenting) (stating ―[i]t would be difficult to overemphasise the stark
consequences of refusing provisional liberty pending trial to the person who is accused of a
crime (of which he is presumed to be innocent). He will most probably lose his
employment, possibly lose his dwelling place, his family‘s life can be totally disrupted and
driven to penury, and even his marriage may be driven to point of breakdown. A person
presumed to be innocent cannot in justice be exposed to such terrible consequences unless
the reasons for so doing completely outweigh all other considerations.‖); H. L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 214–15 (1968); Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A
Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1947–48
(2005).
117. Manns, supra note 116, at 1972.
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These concerns also apply to international criminal defendants. Like
defense attorneys in domestic jurisdictions whose clients are in jail, defense
attorneys at the ICTY spend a great deal of time getting in and out of the
UNDU to visit their clients.118 In addition, if counsel or investigators are
conducting investigations in the former Yugoslavia, communicating with
their clients detained in The Hague can be difficult. Thus far, the tribunal
has not recognized this difficulty as a sufficient reason for provisional
release even where there is no risk of flight or danger.119 Detention in The
Hague interferes with a defendant‘s ability to make a living, much as
detention in a domestic jurisdiction does. However, since international
defendants are likely to face stiff sentences upon conviction even with a
guilty plea, there may be less pressure to plead guilty to do the time and get
on with their lives than in many cases in domestic jurisdictions.
Another aspect of the right to a fair trial implicated by provisional
release is the fairness and transparency of the process by which detention
or release is decided. Arbitrary detention is unfair to defendants,
independent of the potential prejudice a defendant‘s detention may have for
his defense. Further, the transparency of the process and the criteria by
which release or detention is decided is critical. As Professor Diane Marie
Amann has put it, ―[t]ransparency helps to assure that decisions will be
both fair and seen as fair.‖120
5.

The rights of victims to protection and participation
Finally, decisions on provisional release also implicate victims‘ rights,
which are increasingly being recognized as a part of the human rights
picture.121 The past fifty years have seen the emergence of a powerful
movement known as the victims‘ rights movement122 that has impacted
both the domestic123 and international spheres.124
118. Telephone Interview with Norm Sepenuk, Defense Counsel, ICTY (Sept. 14, 2009).
119. See Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Cermak, & Markac, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Decision on
Motion for Provisional Release of Ivan Cermak, ¶¶ 10–11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 14, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tdec/en/080214b.pdf (finding that Cermak had met
the statutory requirements for provisional release, but exercising its discretion to deny
release and finding that ―the mere fact that communication between Counsel and the
Accused would be facilitated if they both were in Croatia at the same time, is not a sufficient
reason for provisional release‖).
120. Diane Marie Amann, Impartiality Deficit and International Criminal Judging, in
ATROCITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: BEYOND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 208,
214–15 (Edel Hughes et al. eds., 2007).
121. See JONATHAN DOAK, VICTIM‘S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF THIRD PARTIES 29–32 (2008) (discussing ―the cross-fertilisation
that is occurring between victimology and human rights‖ and the widespread recognition
that the two are closely linked).
122. See id. at 8–9 (providing a chronology of groups and individuals involved in
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Although the victims‘ rights movement has gained force, it has many
opponents even within the human rights movement. In jurisdictions where
victims have no counsel, some argue that making prosecutors focus on the
interests of victims undermines the traditional role of the prosecutor as a
minister of justice.125 Others voice concerns that the victims‘ rights
movement undermines the presumption of innocence.126 Arguably, giving
a person the status of victim before a conviction presumes the defendant
guilty.127
The central pillars of the victims‘ rights movement are: protection,
participation, remedy, truth, reconciliation, and reparation.128 These pillars
receive varying degrees of international support.129 The ICCPR and the
ECHR recognize victims‘ rights to protection and to an effective remedy 130
but do not recognize a right to participate in criminal proceedings.131 As

campaigning for victim-specific issues).
123. See, e.g., Susanne Walther, Victims’ Rights in the German Court System, 19 FED.
SENT‘G REP. 113, 113 (2006) (describing the transformation in the German court system that
has brought the victim more and more into play as a ―third party‖ in his or her own right);
Sierra Elizabeth, Comment, The Newest Spectator Sport: Why Extending Victims’ Rights to
the Spectators’ Gallery Erodes the Presumption of Innocence, 58 DUKE L.J. 275, 286 (2008)
(noting that in the United States all fifty states and the federal government have enacted
victims‘ rights statutes). See generally KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS‘ RIGHTS:
THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1999) (discussing the emergence of
victims‘ rights as a powerful force in Canadian criminal justice after 1980).
124. See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth
and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1399, 1399 (2002)
(advocating for victim-centered prosecutions as a response to mass atrocities); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’ Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 203
(2006) (discussing the development of victims‘ rights in domestic and international legal
systems, in particular the adoption of two international instruments: the 1985 Declaration of
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the 2006 Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law). See generally DOAK, supra note 121 (drawing from both international
human rights and domestic criminal justice discourses).
125. See, e.g., Erin C. Blondel, Victims’ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J.
237, 273 (2008) (highlighting the conflict between the adversarial process and third-party
interests).
126. See Elizabeth, supra note 123, at 277 n.8 (citing scholars who view victim
involvement as problematic to the procedural protections of defendants).
127. Id.
128. See DOAK, supra note 121, at 243 (enumerating values that he contends any modern
criminal justice system ought to support); see also Aldana-Pindell, supra note 124, at 1405.
129. See DOAK, supra note 121, at 243 (explaining that there is considerable unity
around the values of protection and remedy, but that other values are considerably more
contentious).
130. Aldana-Pindell, supra note 124, at 1419–20. I am unaware of any case in which
victims have brought a claim under the ECHR for a violation of their right to protection
based on a defendant‘s release.
131. See DOAK, supra note 121, at 149 (recounting the sole ECHR case to address the
right to participate, in which the European Commission of Human Rights found no violation
of the ECHR where the mother of a murder victim complained that she had been denied the
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one scholar described it, victims‘ rights to participate in the criminal
process are controversial and ―any such ‗right‘ [is] still very much in the
developmental stage.‖132
To fulfill the obligation to protect victims in the provisional release
context, courts must consider the safety of victims when criminal
defendants are released. It seems that the ―danger‖ or future crimes prong
of the provisional release inquiry, present at both the ICTY and the ICC, is
oriented towards this aim.133
The more controversial issue is whether victims have a right to
participate in release decisions. The victims‘ rights movement contends
that excluding victims from the criminal process is unjust because victims
have an interest in the proceedings and therefore have a right to have their
interest represented.134 However, since victims are unlikely to advocate for
provisional release of a defendant, many defendants‘ rights advocates
question the propriety of their participation in release decisions. Lynne
Henderson has argued that in the United States, the victims‘ rights
movement has accelerated the acceptance of preventive detention for
criminal defendants.135 The argument for detention is that letting the
defendant out leaves the victim wondering whether there is ―any justice in
this world.‖136 Henderson contends that this thinking is understandable, but
personal frustration of victims does not justify punishment before guilt is
established.137
Similarly, in the international sphere, scholars contend that
solicitousness to victims‘ rights often comes at the price of the rights of
defendants. Professor Amann labels the problem the ―impartiality deficit,‖
meaning that the tribunals have ―lost sight of the individuals on whom
suspicion has settled.‖138 As Professors Danner and Martinez have argued,
the ―victim-oriented, civil law model of human rights‖ produces a
disproportionate ―concern for symbolic vindication of violations of
right to be involved in the sentencing process); see also ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 2
(excluding any such right).
132. DOAK, supra note 121, at 33.
133. See infra Part II.B.
134. See Blondel, supra note 125, at 239 (disagreeing that victims‘ rights justify
changing the adversary system).
135. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims’ Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 969–70
(1985).
136. Id. at 971.
137. Id. at 972.
138. AMANN, supra note 120, at 209; see also Diane Marie Amann, Saddam Hussein and
the Impartiality Deficit in International Criminal Justice 4 (working paper Sept. 24, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=813249) (noting that a critique of the impartiality
deficit in international criminal justice should explore issues such as the validity and
circumstances of detention).
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victims‘ human rights‖ and ―has proven a more potent influence than
worries over potential violations of defendants‘ rights.‖139
Scholars have voiced concerns over victim participation rights in the
context of release decisions at international tribunals. Professor Jenia
Iontcheva Turner argues that the decision of the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to allow victims to participate in appeals
of release decisions embodies the ideals of the restorative justice at the
expense of defendants‘ rights.140 Others have argued that the involvement
of civil parties at such an early stage of the case ―could slow down the
proceedings, place an unjust burden on the defense to respond to a
multiplicity of opponents, and risk injecting irrelevant and potentially
prejudicial material into the proceedings‖141 and that the victims‘ natural
bias against the charged person and interest in securing a conviction
prevents them from having the ―sober and objective view on the suspect‖
necessary for a fair decision on detention.142 Moreover, as Turner points
out, the issue raises a conflict between victims‘ right to participation and
defendants‘ rights to the presumption of innocence.143
C. The Human Rights of International Criminal Defendants
Arguably, international human rights norms do not bind international
tribunals and therefore should not constrain tribunals in making their
139. Alison Marston Danner & Jenny Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law,
93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 146 (2005); see also Damaska, supra note 22, at 333 (noting ―the rocky
relationship between the desire to be solicitous of the accused‘s procedural rights and the
desire to provide satisfaction to victims of international crime‖); Gregory S. Gordon,
Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 635, 698 (2007) (arguing that respect for the rights of a defendant
requires a ―neutral, dispassionate setting‖). But see DOAK, supra note 121, at 247–48
(arguing that one need not be too concerned about instances where defendants‘ and victims‘
rights may conflict and that by placing victims‘ rights within the human rights framework, it
gives courts a way of weighing the competing rights).
140. Turner, supra note 318, at 120.
141. Id. at 119 (citing Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ
(PTC01), Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals
(Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Mar. 20, 2008),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/53/PTC_decision_civil_party_nuon_chea
_C11_53_EN.pdf) at ¶ 11(vii); see also Prosecutor v. Nuon, Ieng, Ieng, & Khieu, Case No.
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/PTC, Joint and Several Submissions on Civil-Party Participation in
Appeals Related to Provisional Detention, ¶¶ 28–29 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of
Cambodia Feb. 22, 2008), available at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org.
142. Prof. Christoph Safferling Amicus Curiae concerning Criminal Case File No.
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01) at 7, Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case No. 002/19-09-2007ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01) (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Feb. 22, 2008)
[hereinafter Safferling Amicus Brief],
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/38/Amicus_Christoph_Safferling_C11_3
9_EN.pdf.
143. Turner, supra note 140, at 121.
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provisional release decisions. Not all rights are binding or enforceable in
the first place.144 Even where rights are binding on states, international
tribunals may still be off the hook. Human rights instruments, such as the
ICCPR, the ECHR, and the African Charter for Human Rights, all were
designed with domestic, not international, jurisdictions in mind—a state
shall not deprive a person of certain rights.145
International tribunals have sidestepped human rights norms before.
Most famously, the Nuremburg tribunal is said to have violated the rule of
―nullum crimen sine lege‖ (no crime without preexisting law) in
prosecuting defendants for crimes against humanity and aggression, crimes
that had never before been defined in international or domestic law.146
Similarly, in deciding the jurisdiction of the tribunal over the first
defendant before the ICTY, the Appeals Chamber deemed the international
human rights norm that those charged with crimes have a right to a ―fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law‖147 inapplicable to international tribunals.148
However, the gravity of the crimes alone does not justify a departure
from human rights norms. The European Commission for Human Rights
(Commission) has found that the ECHR‘s right to be tried within a
reasonable time or released still applied to defendants charged with crimes
144. See Bassiouni, supra note 58, at 242 (―They must therefore be considered
individually as well as cumulatively to determine whether there is an obligation by a state to
conform to the requirements of those rights.‖). There are three types of binding legal
norms: ―convention or treaty; a general or particular international custom (as evidenced by
consistent practice and opinio juris); and a general principle of law (as evidenced by other
perfected and unperfected sources of international law or by principles derived from the
major legal systems of the world.‖ Id. Although it is likely an uphill battle in the peacetime
circumstances of most international tribunals, there arguably is a question whether
derogation from such a principle is warranted in the context of international criminal
tribunals. Id. at 252.
145. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 42 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm; see also Starr, supra note
47, at 700 (―Human rights law . . . governs the relations between states and individuals.‖).
146. See Padmanabhan, supra note 42, at 442 & n.45 (noting that Nazi and Japanese
officials were tried for the crime of aggression even though it was not a crime at that time).
147. ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 14(1) (emphasis added); see also Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(1), Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (granting every person the ―right to a hearing, with
due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal, previously established by law‖); ECHR, supra note 23, art. 6(1) (stating also that
―everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law‖).
148. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 42 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm. The Appeals Chamber
nevertheless concluded that the ICTY had been ―established by law‖ in the sense that it was
established in accordance with the rule of law. Id.
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against humanity.149 In Jentzsch v. Germany,150 the Commission examined
Jentzsch‘s claim of unreasonable detention during the investigation and
prosecution of his trial for his ―active[] participat[ion] in the so-called
‗death bath‘ operations in the Gusen concentration camp.‖151 Despite
finding the norm against unreasonable detention applicable, the
Commission considered the special features of the case, including the
potential life sentence, the great number of witnesses and suspects
involved, and the fact that the crime occurred outside of Germany, in
assessing the diligence of the German authorities and found no violation of
Article 5(3) of the ECHR, despite detention of some six years pre-trial,
over a year at trial and two years during appellate proceedings.152
ICTY judges seem to be conflicted on the applicability of human rights
law, at least as expressed by the ECtHR, to their provisional release
decisions.153 Noting some of the special features of international tribunals
discussed below, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic154
explained that ―care should be taken that too great a reliance is not placed
upon [the decisions of the ECHR and the Commission] as defining what is
a reasonable length of pre-trial detention in an international criminal court
or tribunal rather than in particular domestic jurisdictions in Europe.‖155
The court emphasized that it must consider the circumstances in which the
tribunal must operate in assessing what is a reasonable length of pre-trial
detention at the ICTY.156
Other ICTY chambers seem less inclined to take provisional release at
international tribunals out of the realm of human rights law. In Prosecutor

149. See Jentzsch v. Germany, App. No. 2604/65, 1971 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 14, ¶¶
10–11 (Eur. Comm‘n on H.R.); see also SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 145 n.481 (citing
Jentzsch and noting that, in Jentzsch, the Commission nevertheless found no violation of the
right to be tried within a reasonable time due to the special circumstances of the case).
150. 1971 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 14, ¶¶ 10–11.
151. Id.
152. SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 145 n.481; see also Jentzsch v. Germany, 1971 Y.B.
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 14, ¶ 171 (Eur. Comm‘n on H.R.); Rosenbaum v. Germany, App. No.
3376/67, Eur. Comm‘n on H.R. Dec. & Rep. 29, 31–49, (1969) (finding that the length of
detention on remand of six years and eleven months alone did not violate Article 5(3)).
153. See supra note 24 (providing examples where ICTY judges were split on whether
the ECtHR law binds the Tribunal).
154. Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Motion by Radoslav Brdanin for Provisional
Release, ¶ 26 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 25, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/00725PR213239.htm.
155. Id.
156. Id. at ¶ 27; see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, & Landzo, Case No. IT-9621-A, Order of the Appeals Chamber on Hazim Delic‘s Emergency Motion to Reconsider
Denial of Request for Provisional Release (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June
1, 1999), available at http://icr.icty.org. (listing factors considered in deciding the length of
the pre-trial detention).
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v. Limaj,157 the Appeals Chamber stated: ―[t]he ICTY is entrusted with
bringing justice to the former Yugoslavia. First and foremost, this means
justice for the victims, their relatives and other innocent people. Justice,
however, also means respect for the alleged perpetrators‘ fundamental
rights.‖158 It concluded that the ICTY‘s rules on provisional release ―must
therefore be read in the light of the ICCPR and ECHR and the relevant
jurisprudence.‖159 In particular, it flagged the ICCPR and ECHR‘s
mandates that an accused be presumed innocent until proved guilty and that
―it shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained
in custody.‖160 It also stated that the international human rights principle of
proportionality must be considered in interpreting the ICTY‘s rules on
provisional release.161 The Trial Chamber concluded that ―no distinction
can be drawn between persons facing criminal procedures in their home
country or on an international level.‖162
The ICC appears to agree that it must adhere to international human
rights norms, even in the context of provisional release. Unlike the ICTY‘s
statute, which enumerates the rights of defendants, but does not explicitly
incorporate international human rights law,163 the Rome Statute creating the
ICC provides that its law must be interpreted in accordance with
international human rights law.164 In Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo165 case,
157. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, & Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir
Limaj‘s Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/acdec/en/031031-3.htm.
158. Id.
159. Id. at ¶ 12.
160. Id. at ¶ 9. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber denied leave to appeal the Trial
Chamber decision denying release. Id. at ¶ 42.
161. Id., ¶ 13 (―[W]hen interpreting Rule 65(B) and (D) of the Rules, the general
principle of proportionality must be taken into account. A measure in public international
law is proportional only when it is (1) suitable, (2) necessary and when (3) its degree and
scope remain in a reasonable relationship to the envisaged target. Procedural measures
should never be capricious or excessive. If it is sufficient to use a more lenient measure
than mandatory detention, it must be applied.‖); see also Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused
Momir Talic, ¶ 23 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (same); GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER
KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 143 (2005) (noting the ICTY Appeal Chamber‘s observation in Limaj and
quoting, in part, the same language).
162. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Bala, & Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir
Limaj‘s Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/acdec/en/031031-3.htm.
163. See ICCPR, supra note 57, art. 21 (enumerating the ―Rights of the accused‖).
164. Rome Statute, supra note 59, art 21(3).
165. Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 12, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor
against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ―Decision on the release of Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo‖, ¶ 37 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578365.pdf.
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the Appeals Chamber invoked the ICCPR, the ECHR, the American
Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples‘ Rights to support its assertion that ―the Chamber must be vigilant
that any continued detention would not be for an unreasonably long period
of time, in breach of internationally recognised human rights.‖166 Of
course, it did not state that the jurisprudence of courts interpreting those
conventions in the context of domestic criminal trials would determine the
length of reasonable detention at the ICC.
Arguing that international courts should not be bound by precedent
dealing with the reasonableness of detention in domestic jurisdictions,
scholars and courts have listed a number of factors that distinguish
international criminal tribunals from domestic jurisdictions including the
gravity of the crimes,167 the lack of a police force,168 the security situation
in the region, the danger in and difficulty of apprehending defendants,169
166. Id.
167. WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 234; see Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 25 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm
(noting
that
―the
Tribunal‘s jurisdiction is limited to serious offences‖); Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana, &
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR65, Fofana – Appeal Against Decision Refusing Bail,
¶ 31 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Mar. 11, 2005) (stating that ―[i]nternational criminal law
takes cognisance only of the most heinous crimes known to humankind‖); see also
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR65, Sesay - Decision on
Appeal Against Refusal of Bail, ¶¶ 28, 36–37 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Dec. 14, 2004).
168. See Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional
Release, ¶ 24 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm (calling for a more cautious
approach in assessing the risk that an accused may abscond); Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic,
Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Motion by Momir Talic for Provisional Release, ¶ 18
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 28, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (explaining that the Tribunal
depends on local authorities and international bodies to act on its behalf since it has no
power to execute arrest warrants); Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 &
40-PT, Decision on Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 10
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001) (Robinson, J., dissenting),
available at http://icr.icty.org (―The Tribunal‘s jurisprudence is that the lack of a police
force, and its dependence on domestic enforcement mechanisms to enforce its arrest
warrants, justify a stricter approach to applications for provisional release than is the case
with applications for bail in domestic jurisdictions.‖); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, & Gbao,
Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR65, Sesay - Decision on Appeal Against Refusal of Bail, ¶¶ 28,
36-37 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Dec. 14, 2004) (indicating that meaningful conditions
and guarantees are important in light of these factors); WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at
236 (expressing the concern that the absence of a police force increases the likelihood that
―once released an accused could escape the International Tribunal‘s grasp‖). Wald and
Martinez also argue that tribunals lack sanctions for violations of release conditions or
failure to appear. Id. However, this argument ignores the power of the court to take into
account the defendant‘s misconduct at sentencing. Although this tool requires that the
defendant be brought again before the court, so too do domestic sanctions for failure to
appear.
169. See WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 235.
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and the vulnerability of witnesses and evidence due to defendants‘
positions of influence along with liberal discovery rules.170
However, international tribunals are not always as exceptional as
claimed.
Domestic jurisdictions also try defendants for serious
international crimes, including crimes against humanity, genocide, and war
crimes.171 Although in theory the tribunals seek to prosecute the people
―most responsible‖ and to let domestic jurisdictions handle lower level war
criminals,172 this is not always the case.173 Moreover, the security situation
may or may not be appreciably worse than in a domestic jurisdiction. As
Safferling notes, in many cases, where the conflict has ended, the risk of
the defendants engaging in more crimes like those with which they are
charged is extremely low.174 Finally, although UN peacekeepers and others
risked their lives to arrest suspects who have absconded, this argument
does not apply to defendants who have voluntarily surrendered.175
Furthermore, in domestic jurisdictions, police also often risk their lives to
arrest suspects.
All of these arguments seem worthy of concern and support a rigorous
inquiry into the danger to victims, witnesses and the community, as well as
the risk of flight. However, the peculiarities of international tribunals do
not warrant a blanket denial of release to international criminal defendants
on trial. Other means of addressing issues like vulnerability of witnesses
and evidence short of detention, including reforming discovery rules to
afford victims more protection, should be explored.176 Moreover, the
special features of international tribunals do not explain why defendants are
released pre-trial, often for years, and then locked up once the trial begins.
Still, even if international tribunals are different from domestic
jurisdictions and are not technically bound by human rights instruments, for
the reasons described in Section I(A), tribunals should make their
170. Id. at 237.
171. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 655.
172. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (stating that the ICTY
should ―concentrat[e] on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of
being most responsible for crimes within the ICTY‘s jurisdiction and transfer[] cases
involving those who may not bear this level of responsibility to competent national
jurisdictions‖); see also S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004)
(providing that the Security Council ―[c]alls on [the ICTY and ICTR], in reviewing and
confirming any new indictments, to ensure that any such indictments concentrate on the
most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the relevant Tribunal as set out in resolution 1503 (2003)‖).
173. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 643 (arguing that the pursuit of lowlevel cases delays justice).
174. See SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 144–45.
175. Judge Wald and Professor Jenny Martinez wrote before voluntary surrender of
defendants became common.
176. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 697.
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provisional release regimes reflect human rights law best practices in order
to achieve their extremely important function of promoting respect for
human rights.
II. PROVISIONAL RELEASE AT THE ICTY
At the ICTY, largely due to the appearance of governments in the former
Yugoslavia more willing to work with the tribunal after the European
Union (EU) made cooperation with the ICTY a condition for admission for
Croatia and Serbia177 and the rise in voluntary surrenders by defendants,178
defendants are increasingly being released before trial and even during
court breaks.179 However, as noted above, all are detained for trial.
The ICTY is of particular interest in the study of provisional release at
international tribunals because it has released the greatest number of
defendants and has the greatest wealth of jurisprudence on release. Of the
161 people who have been charged by the ICTY, 35 ICTY defendants have
been released pre-trial, and 32 have been released for varying periods of
time after the commencement of trial.180 There are some 598 judicial
decisions and 522 motions and briefs with the term ―provisional release‖ in
the title, as well as some 1146 judicial decisions that mention provisional
release.181

177. The Croat and Serb governments resisted the Yugoslavia tribunal for years, until the
European Union made compliance with the tribunal a condition for future EU membership.
Marcia Luyten, France and the Tutsi have to face justice in Rwanda too, NRC
HANDELSBLAD, June 23, 2009,
http://www.nrc.nl/international/article2280195.ece.
178. As of September 7, 2009, of a total 161 indictees, 2 remain at large, 66 were
arrested, 62 surrendered, 10 died before transfer to the tribunal, 20 had their indictments
withdrawn, and 1 was transferred from a prison where he was serving an unrelated sentence
imposed by a local court. See Email from Stuart Lester, Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Media Office, to author (Sept. 7, 2009, 1:46 PDT) (on file with author).
179. For example, the court granted pre-trial release to all six of the accused in Prlic on
September 8, 2004. All returned to the UNDU for trial on April 24, 2006. See Prosecutor v.
Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74, Case Information Sheet,
7,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/cis/en/cis_prlic_al_en.pdf (stating that all six men were
granted provisional release before trial from September 8, 2004 until April 24, 2006).
Likewise, in the Stanisic & Simatovic case, on July 28, 2004, the Trial Chamber granted
provisional release to both accused. See Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT03-69, Case Information Sheet, 4,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/cis/en/cis_stanisic_simatovic_en.pdf
(discussing the procedural history of the case before trial). On February 6, 2008, the Trial
Chamber terminated the provisional release of both accused and ordered them to return to
the UNDU on February 11, 2008 for trial, which was to begin later in the month. Id.
180. See, e.g., supra note 179 (providing two ICTY Case Information Sheets).
181. This information is available through the ICTY Court Records search engine,
http://icr.icty.org.
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In theory, the law on provisional release at the ICTY comports with
international human rights, but the reality of excessive discretion, de facto
detention for trial and the new burden of showing ―sufficiently compelling
humanitarian circumstances‖ raises human rights concerns.
A. Provisional Release Procedures at the ICTY
Generally, upon confirmation of the indictment by a pre-trial chamber of
the ICTY, the pre-trial chamber issues an arrest warrant, which includes an
order for prompt transfer of the accused to the ICTY.182 The ICTY has
determined that ―[t]he arrest warrant provides the legal basis for
detention.‖183 Once an accused is transferred, he or she is detained by the
ICTY at the UNDU in The Hague and may not then be released without an
order of the court.184 It is noteworthy, however, that the rules envision that
all ICTY defendants arrive pursuant to an arrest warrant. There is no
written provision by which they can appear by summons.185
The ICTY rule on the initial appearance of an accused does not mention
the issue of detention,186 but a defendant or the court may raise the issue at
this hearing.187 Thus, it can be said that the defendant is ―entitled to take
182. Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Order on Miodrag Jokic‘s Motion for
Provisional Release, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tord/en/20220PR117242.htm; see also Prosecutor v.
Ademi, Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 16 (Int‘l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm (noting that the judge
generally orders prompt transfer of the accused after confirming an indictment).
183. Prosecutor v. Ademi, Case No. IT-01-46-PT, Order on Motion for Provisional
Release, ¶ 16 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ademi/tord/en/20220PR117236.htm (outlining the procedural
considerations for detention and release); see also Gordon, supra note 139, at 690
(describing the pre-trial detention procedures).
184. Pursuant to Rule 64:
Upon being transferred to the seat of the Tribunal, the accused shall be detained in
facilities provided by the host country, or by another country. In exceptional
circumstances, the accused may be held in facilities outside of the host country.
The President may, on the application of a party, request modification of the
conditions of detention of an accused.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Rule 64, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Rules of
Procedure], available at
http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/RulesofProcedureandEvidence; see also id. Rule
65(A) (describing the procedures for release).
185. Nevertheless, as noted above, in at least two contempt cases, the court refused to
issue arrest warrants and instead ordered the defendants to appear by summons. See supra
note 5 (providing two examples of cases in which the court ordered an appearance by
summons in lieu of holding defendants in contempt).
186. ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 62 (discussing the right to counsel,
right to a plea, and right to have material in a language the defendant understands, among
other rights).
187. See Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42-PT, Order on Miodrag Jokic‘s Motion
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proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without
delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the
detention is not lawful‖ such that the requirements of the ICCPR are met.
However, at the ICTY, ―[t]he fact of detention and the reasons for it are
rarely, if at all, raised as issues to be discussed at the initial appearance.‖188
They are handled principally through written submissions.189 The ICTY
rules do not provide for periodic review of detention decisions. If a
defendant wishes to be released, he or she must file a motion.
At the ICTY, to release a defendant, a Trial Chamber must be satisfied
that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, pose no risk to any
victim, witness or other person.190 As noted above, the ECtHR and the
United States Supreme Court recognize the validity of these grounds for
detention.191 Although the ICTY has done away with the requirement that a
defendant also show that ―exceptional circumstances‖ warrant release,192
for Provisional Release, ¶ 16 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tord/en/20220PR117242.htm (explaining that an
accused may raise the issue of his or her detention proprio motu).
188. VLADIMIR TOCHILOVSKY, JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 609 (2008)
(explaining that the issue of detention generally does not arise until more facts of the case
have been considered).
189. For example, during his initial appearance, ICTY defendant Jadranko Prlic stated
that he did not believe that he should be detained, but no hearing on provisional release
occurred at that time. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Transcript of Initial
Appearance, 48:3–4 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 6, 2004), available at
http://icr.icty.org. Prlic‘s co-accused, Valentin Coric, also stated ―I am not exactly thrilled
by the fact that I am being held in detention.‖ Id. Four months later, there was a provisional
release hearing for the six defendants in the Prlic case, but the presiding judge instructed the
parties that it merely wanted to hear if there were any arguments, beyond those made in the
written submissions, for release. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Transcript of
Motion Hearing, 65:20–25 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 19, 2004),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/trans/en/040719MH.htm.
Neither party presented any witnesses. Id.
190. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 44 (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter
ICTY Rules of Procedure], available at
http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/RulesofProcedureandEvidence.
191. See supra notes 107–08.
192. ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 65(B). Prior to December 1999, an
accused before the ICTY could be released from detention only if he or she could show that
―exceptional circumstances‖ warranted release. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev. 13 (July 10, 1998), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/file/LegalLibrary/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev13_en.pdf;
see also DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1430 (proposing language to amend the statute). Under
this rule, only four accused were granted provisional release. DeFrank, supra note 20, at
1430. Scholars, defendants and at least one judge criticized the ―exceptional circumstances‖
requirement for violating the human rights norm that pretrial detention be the exception
rather than the rule. See, e.g., SAFFERLING, supra note 41, at 143 (stating that ICTY Rules
of Procedure 64 and 65 ―foresee detention on remand as the general rule, liberty of the
suspect as the exception‖ and arguing that this regime violates Article 9(III)2 of the
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even under the amended rule, the burden of proving that he or she is neither
a flight risk nor a danger remains on the defendant.193 As noted above, the
ECtHR has held that the burden of proving the need to detain a criminal
defendant must be on the prosecution.194
The ICTY‘s rules also state that the court must give ―the host country
and the State to which the accused seeks to be released the opportunity to
be heard.‖195For pre-trial release and release during court breaks, ICTY
defendants have had few problems getting their home countries to
guarantee that they will supervise and return the defendant to the ICTY.196
However, particularly in the early days of the tribunal, judges were
unwilling to give much weight to these guarantees, since many states in the
former Yugoslavia were uncooperative with the tribunal and harbored
fugitives.197 When a defendant is released, he or she falls under the
jurisdiction of the states to which he or she is released.198

ICCPR); DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1430 (discussing ICTY Judge Robinson‘s view that to
read Rule 65 in a manner consistent with human rights norms, the burden of proof must be
on the prosecution). Various Trial Chambers in early cases stated that the ―exceptional
circumstances‖ requirement was a reflection of the tribunal‘s incorporation of the notion of
preventive detention in light of the ―extreme gravity of the crimes for which [the accused]
are being prosecuted.‖ Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, et al., Case No. IT-95-16-PT, Decision on
Motion for Provisional Release Filed by Zorna Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Drago
Josipovic and Dragan Papic (Joined by Marinko Katava and Vladimir Santic), ¶ 10 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 15, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tdec/en/71215pr2.htm.
193. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaz, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on
Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 8 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/070720.pdf (―It is for the accused to prove
that the conditions of Rule 65(B) have been met and to satisfy the Trial Chamber that
release is appropriate in a particular case.‖ (internal citations omitted)); see also DeFrank,
supra note 20, at 1431 (indicating that the amended rules left the burden of proving release
factors on the defendant).
194. See supra Part I.B.1.
195. ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 65(B).
196. See Rearick, supra note 4, at 592–93 (noting that, unlike ICTY defendants, ICTR
defendants have problems in getting released due to the unwillingness of Rwanda or other
countries to take them).
197. Professors Wald and Martinez argued that after an amendment removing the
―exceptional circumstances‖ requirement, ―the heart of the release proceeding is the
defendants‘ ability to convince the judges that there are conditions which will guarantee
their return and the safety of victims and witnesses.‖ WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at
245; see also Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 18 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org (noting that ―until there
is evidence of arrests, any guarantee from the government must be treated with caution‖).
198. Prosecutor v. Lukic & Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Sredoje Lukic‘s
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 23 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 13,
2006), available at http://icr.icty.org (acknowledging that the State and Tribunal must work
together to satisfy the requirements of Rule 65).
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The ICTY‘s Statute and Rules provide no basis for compensation for
unlawful detention. However, the Appeals Chamber has held that
compensation would be appropriate for a defendant who is both unlawfully
detained and acquitted.199 Reversing an earlier decision to release the
defendant based on several violations of his rights,200 the Appeals Chamber
in the ICTR case Prosecutor v. Baraygwiza found that the appropriate
remedy was compensation if the defendant was acquitted or a reduced
sentence to reflect the violation of his rights if he was convicted.201
Still, ICTY law makes no provision for compensation of a defendant
who is acquitted, if the detention was lawful. ICTY Appeals Judge
Schomburg has recently explained that:
It is deplorable that the UN ad hoc International Tribunals are not at least
in the position to grant financial compensation to accused parties who
have been acquitted, in particular when the deprivation of liberty over
years of pre-trial detention and detention pending appeal is in whole or in
part attributable to the Tribunal.202

Providing compensation to acquitted defendants detained for long
periods of time would express respect for the human rights compromised
by lengthy detention.
B. Judicial Discretion on Provisional Release

199. E.g., Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision
(Prosecutor‘s Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 75 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Mar. 31, 2000) (deciding that the accused is entitled to compensation if found not guilty);
Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Decision (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
May 31, 2000),
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CSemanza%5Cdecision
s%5C310500.pdf. The ICTY and ICTR share an Appeals Chamber, and ICTY Trial
Chambers must follow the decisions of the Appeals Chamber. See Carsten Stahn and Göran
Sluiter, The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, 309 (2009).
200. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, ¶¶ 100–101, 104, 113
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 3, 1999),
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBarayagwiza%5Cdeci
sions%5Cdcs991103.pdf (finding violations of the defendant‘s rights to be promptly
charged and to be informed of the charges against him, to a timely initial appearance, to
challenge the legality of his detention, and to a speedy trial after Baraygwiza‘s three year
detention on remand, eleven months of which the court declared illegal, and ordering his
release); see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 256 (noting that in the Appeals Chamber‘s first
ruling it had dismissed the indictment with prejudice due to the seriousness of the violations
of the defendants‘ rights).
201. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor‘s
Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 75 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Mar. 31, 2000),
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBarayagwiza%5Cdeci
sions%5Cdcs20000331.pdf;
see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 256–57 (discussing the Appeals Chamber‘s decision in
Barayagwiza).
202. See Schomburg, supra note 6, at 77 (conceding that international human rights law
requires compensation only after a conviction is reversed and not after an acquittal).
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The broad discretion of ICTY judges to deny release raises international
human rights problems. ICTY judges may detain defendants even if they
pose neither a risk of flight nor a danger. If ―it is satisfied that the accused
will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a danger to any victim,
witness or other person . . . . Release may be ordered by a Trial
Chamber.‖203 The rule is a baseline and sets out ―the minimum
requirements necessary for granting provisional release.‖204
Trial
Chambers interpreting the rule have clarified that a Trial Chamber may
exercise its discretion to deny provisional release even where an accused
meets the requirements of Rule 65(B).205
ICTY case law provides guidance to judges in deciding risk of flight or
danger but may do little to cabin the discretion of judges in denying release
for reasons other than risk of flight or danger. Trial Chambers are to make a
case-by-case assessment on release based on the concrete situation of the
accused.206 They must consider not only the circumstances as they are at
the time of the release decision but also as they are expected to be at the
time of the accused‘s return to the tribunal if released.207
Although ―[i]n deciding whether the requirements of Rule 65(B) have
been met, a Chamber must consider all of those relevant factors that a

203. ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 65(B) (emphasis added). In
addition, ―[t]he Trial Chamber may impose such conditions upon the release of the accused
as it may determine appropriate, including the execution of a bail bond and the observance
of such conditions as are necessary to ensure the presence of the accused for trial and the
protection of others.‖ Id. Rule 65(C) (emphasis added).
204. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on
Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 8 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/070720.pdf.
205. Id. The decision on release is appealable. See ICTY Rules Of Procedure, supra
note 184Error! Bookmark not defined., Rule 65(D)–(H) (providing rules governing
appeals).
206. Prosecutor v. Brdanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion for
Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic, ¶ 21 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm; see also KNOOPS, supra note
161, at 140 (same).
207. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal From Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise
en Liberte Provisoire de L’accuse Prlic Dated 7 April 2008‖, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080425.pdf. The issue has come up in the
context of political circumstances. In Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, the Prosecution
opposed release in part based on an increased risk of flight due to the upcoming elections in
the Serbian government, which could yield a government hostile to the tribunal. Prosecutor
v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 45 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf. The Trial Chamber
rejected the argument as too speculative. Id.
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reasonable Chamber would have been expected to take into account before
coming to a decision [and] provide a reasoned opinion indicating its view
on those relevant factors,‖208 almost all of the factors set out in the case law
pertain to flight or danger, and judges are not restricted to considering these
factors.209 According to tribunal jurisprudence, the following factors are
relevant to the provisional release inquiry:
(1) Whether the accused is charged with serious criminal offences;
(2) Whether the accused is likely to face a long prison term, if
convicted;
(3) The circumstances of the accused‘s surrender;210
(4) The degree of cooperation given by the authorities of the State
to which the accused seeks to be released;
(5) The guarantees offered by those authorities, and any personal
guarantees offered by the accused;
(6) The likelihood that, in case of breach of the conditions of
provisional release, the relevant authorities will re-arrest the
accused if he declines to surrender;211 and
(7) The accused‘s degree of cooperation with the Prosecution.212
208. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, Lukic, Case No.
IT-05-87-T, Decision on Milutinovic Motion for Temporary Provisional Release, ¶ 12 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 16, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/081216.pdf.
209. Id. (―What the relevant factors are, as well as the weight to be accorded to them,
depends upon the circumstances of each case.‖).
210. See Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 23 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org (quoting the Trial
Chamber decision stating, ―[i]n the earlier cases in which provisional release was granted,
the accused in both cases had surrendered voluntarily‖); cf. Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case
No. ICTR-00-55A-R65, Decision on Defence Motion for Reconsideration of Decision
Denying Provisional Release, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Apr. 3, 2009),
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CMuvunyi%5Cdecision
s%5C090403.pdf (denying motion to reconsider decision denying provisional release and
noting that ―the Chamber must take into account the fact that he did not voluntarily
surrender to the Tribunal, but was apprehended in London‖).
211. See Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision
on Ramush Haradinaj‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 23, 25 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia June 6, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/050606.htm
(noting that Chambers must take into consideration the position the accused held prior to his
arrest, since it ―could have an important bearing upon a State‘s willingness and readiness to
arrest that person if he refuses to surrender himself‖).
212. These factors are set forth in a number of ICTY cases. E.g., Prosecutor v. Stanisic
and Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶¶ 39–40 (Int‘l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
26,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf;
see also Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaz, & Brahimaj, Decision on Ramush Haradinaj‘s
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 25 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 6,
2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/050606.htm (stating that the weight
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In addition, judges should take into account ―any suggestion that the
[a]ccused has interfered with the administration of justice since the
confirmation of the indictment against him;‖213 ―the health condition and
considerations regarding treatment of ill detainees;‖214 and the complexity
of the case.215 Of these factors, only the last two are unrelated to risk of
flight or danger.
B. The ICTY’s De Facto “Detention for Trial” Regime
In theory, the standard for release is the same whether or not trial has
begun. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that ―Rule 65(B) applies to
provisional release issues arising during the trial, just as it applies during
pre-trial and pre-appeal proceedings.‖216 Nevertheless, early in the
tribunal‘s existence, an ICTY Trial Chamber stated that ―generally it would
be inappropriate to grant provisional release during trial because, inter alia,
release could disrupt the remaining course of the trial.‖217
In practice, there appears to be a shift in the standard once trial begins.
Although pre-trial release has become increasingly common, all

given to governmental guarantees is dependent on the circumstances present); Prosecutor v.
Sainovic & Ojdanic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR65, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 6 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 30, 2002), available at http://icr.icty.org (listing
the numerous factors considered by the court).
213. Stanisic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT at ¶ 39. Prosecutor v. Stanisic and Simatovic, Case
No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶¶ 39–40 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf
214. Id. at ¶¶ 39–40.
215. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 23 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org
(indicating that if a case is less serious or complex, there is a greater probability that
provisional release will be granted).
216. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, Lukic, Case No.
IT-05-87-AR65.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of Denial of Provisional Release
During the Winter Recess, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 2006),
available at http://icr.icty.org; see also Prosecutor v. Aleksovksi, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T,
Decision Denying a Request for Provisional Release, 3 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 1998), available at http://icr.icty.org (explaining that, because the
presumption of innocence until a final judgment on the merits and bail decisions implicated
questions of individual freedom, a defendant could turn to Rule 65(B) to seek release until a
final decision on the merits).
217. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 10, 14 (Int‘l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org (citing Prosecutor v.
Kordic & Cerkez, Order on Application by Dario Kordic for Provisional Release Pursuant to
Rule 65, 4 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 1999)). According to the
ICTY Media Office, the Kordic decision is confidential and therefore unavailable to the
public. See Email from Joanna Ellis Adwan, Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Media Office, to author (Sept. 16, 2009, 02:35 PDT) (on file with author).
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defendants, other than a few charged only with contempt,218 remain in
custody of the UNDU during trial. Perhaps because all ICTY defendants
charged with genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes start out
detained and return to the UNDU for trial is made a condition of their pretrial release, defendants do not appear to fight this de facto detention for
trial regime. The fight then is merely over whether they are released during
court breaks219 or due to illness220 or other discrete ―humanitarian
circumstances.‖
ICTY judges seem more comfortable releasing defendants, even for
short periods, before trial than after trial has begun. In the case of
Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic,221 the Trial Chamber characterized the
case as being in the pre-trial stage before granting release, even though the
parties had given opening statements and a witness had testified.222
If a case is near its inception, courts will still grant release by applying
the ordinary Rule 65(B) risk of flight or danger standard. For example,
early in the case of Prosecutor v. Perisic,223 the Trial Chamber granted
218. See supra note 5 (providing examples of two defendants who were summoned to
appear in lieu of being held in contempt).
219. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T,
Decision on Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 24 (Int‘l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
14,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/071214.pdf (ordering Haradinaj‘s release to
Kosovo during the winter court recess after the close of evidence and before judgment);
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-PT, Decision on Ramush
Haradinaj‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 51–52 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 6, 2005),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/050606.htm
(ordering Haradinaj‘s pre-trial release to Kosovo).
220. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion for
Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic, ¶ 31 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (ordering that Talic be let out
of the UNDU due to terminal illness and kept on house arrest in the former Yugoslavia).
221. Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶¶ 14, 42, 68 (Int‘l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf.
222. Id. Although the parties had given their opening statements and a witness had been
called, the Trial Chamber stated that, in its view, ―the case [was then] properly described as
being in the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.‖ Id. at ¶¶ 6, 42, 63. The Appeals Chamber
stated that it was within the Trial Chamber‘s discretion to determine that the case was in the
pre-trial stage, but found its reasoning inadequate. The Appeals Chamber nevertheless
upheld release. Prosecutor v. Stanisic & Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-AR65.4, Decision
on Prosecution Appeal of Decision on Provisional Release and Motions to Present
Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115, ¶¶ 43, 72–73 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia
June
26,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/acdec/en/080626.pdf.
223. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for
Provisional Release During the Court‘s Winter Recess, ¶ 19 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/081217.pdf.
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Perisic provisional release for the period of the winter break from
December 22, 2008 to January 9, 2009 and refused additional security
measures, such as twenty-four-hour surveillance.224
As the trial proceeds, courts grow even more reluctant to release
defendants even for court breaks. In December 2006, the Appeals
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Milutinovic225 upheld the Trial Chamber‘s denial
of provisional release based on the increased risk of flight due to the
amount of evidence that had come in at trial.226 According to the
Prosecution, ―since the Defendants had now heard the serious evidence
against them, they had a higher incentive to abscond, particularly
considering the potential penalties that might follow a conviction.‖227
Although the defendants had been released previously and returned for
trial, the Trial Chamber found that the risk of flight had increased since the
previous provisional release, because ―17 weeks of trial ha[d] elapsed, and
85 witnesses ha[d] given evidence relating to multiple alleged crimes
committed throughout Kosovo for which the Accused are said to be
responsible.‖228
The same Trial Chamber refused to consider whether the weight of the
evidence, including, according to the defendant, the weakening of the
prosecution‘s case, decreased the risk of flight in the defendant‘s
subsequent application for provisional release based on compassionate
grounds.229 In response to the Accused‘s argument that the Prosecution‘s
case had weakened, the Chamber noted
For the Chamber to agree with the Accused‘s point about the purported
weakening of the Prosecution case, it would have to weigh the evidence
adduced by the Prosecution against that of the Accused, and this is a task

The Perisic trial had started October 2, 2008. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T,
Case Information Sheet, 3,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/cis/en/cis_perisic_en.pdf.
224. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for
Provisional Release During the Court‘s Winter Recess, ¶ 19 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/081217.pdf.
225. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, & Lukic, Case
No. IT-05-87-AR65.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of Denial of Provisional Release
During the Winter Recess, ¶¶ 14–15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14,
2006), available at http://icr.icty.org.
226. Id.
227. Id. at ¶ 14.
228. Id.
229. Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkovic, Lazarevic, & Lukic, Case
No. IT-05-87-T, Decision on Pavkovic Motion for Temporary Provisional Release, ¶ 2 (Int‘l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/071207c.pdf.
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reserved for the Chamber‘s final assessment of all the evidence at the
conclusion of the trial, not at this stage.‖230

Apparently, it is permissible to quantify the prosecution‘s evidence—
number of witnesses, documents, and the like—to assess the likelihood that
a defendant be inclined to flee, but not to assess the strength or weakness of
the evidence against the accused for the same purpose.
The named accused in the case, whom the Trial Chamber refused to
release based on the amount of the evidence against him, Milutinovic, was
later acquitted.231 Worse still than the earlier denial of provisional release,
the Trial Chamber denied release to Milutinovic for the time between the
end of trial and the delivery of the judgment—a period of six months—
only to finally release him upon the delivery of the judgment.232
The ICTY, despite recognizing the defendants‘ rights to a speedy trial,233
has come under fire for delays in completing trials.234 If everyone is
detained for trial, long trials means long periods of detention.
Worrying though it may be, lengthy detention before judgment is not, by
itself, a human rights violation, at least according to the ECtHR. As ICTY
judges have noted, the ECtHR has upheld pre-trial detention of several
years in some circumstances.235 However, the ECtHR has found violations
of Article 5(3) where the reasons for detention offered by governments
were insufficient.236 The beginning of trial is, indubitably, insufficient
ground to justify detention where there is neither risk of flight nor danger.

230. Id. at ¶ 2.
231. Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pavkociv, Lazarevic, Lukic, & Milutinovic, Case
Information Sheet, Case No. IT-05-87,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/cis/en/cis_sainovic_al_en_1.pdf.
232. See id.
233. ICTY Statute, supra note 59, art. 21(4)(c) (acknowledging that the accused has the
right ―to be tried without undue delay‖).
234. See Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT‘L L.
79, 82 (2009) (criticizing the slow pace of international criminal justice and surveying the
literature discussing the length of international criminal proceedings).
235. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001), available at http://icr.icty.org; W. v. Switzerland, 254
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1993) (four years pre-trial detention); Ferrari-Braro v. Italy, App.
9627/81, 37 Eur. Comm‘n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 15 (1984) (Eleven months pre-trial detention).
236. See, e.g., Letellier v. France, 207 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 9, ¶¶ 13, 33 (1991)
(finding that, despite the gravity of the alleged crime, murder for hire, and the potentially
lengthy sentence the defendant faced, there was insufficient evidence of risk of flight or
obstruction or danger to the public order to justify her continued detention); Neumeister v.
Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 39, ¶ 10 (1968) (finding insufficient evidence of risk of
flight to justify seven years of detention during the investigation and trial).
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C. Release, a Moving Target: The “Sufficiently Compelling
Humanitarian Circumstances” Requirement after the Close of the
Prosecution’s Case
After the close of the prosecution‘s case, if a Trial Chamber declines to
issue a judgment of acquittal on all counts, release even on court breaks
becomes more difficult.237 In March 2008, the ICTY Appeals Chamber
added a new requirement for provisional release, not stated in Rule 65, for
cases in which Trial Chambers have declined to enter a judgment of
acquittal at the end of the prosecution‘s case.238 At this stage, for an
accused to be released, not only must a trial chamber conduct a new
assessment of the risk of flight in light of the 98 bis decision,239 but also it
must find that there exist ―serious and sufficiently compelling humanitarian
reasons‖ for the release.240
With one exception,241 subsequent Appeals Chamber decisions
confirmed that ―serious and compelling humanitarian circumstances‖
237. As at all of the international tribunals, ICTY defendants have an opportunity to seek
a judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecution case. See SCHABAS, supra note 62, at
516 (linking this opportunity to the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor‘s burden
of proof). Rule 98 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY provides: ―At
the close of the Prosecutor‘s case, the Trial Chamber shall, by oral decision and after
hearing the oral submissions of the parties, enter a judgement of acquittal on any count if
there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction.‖ Rules of Procedure and Evidence
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 98 bis, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev. 43 (July 24, 2009), available at
http://www.icty.org/sections/LegalLibrary/RulesofProcedureandEvidence.
238. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74AR65.5, Decision on Prosecution‘s Consolidated Appeal Against Decisions to Provisionally
Release The Accused Prlic, Stojic, Petkovic and Coric, ¶ 20 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080311.pdf.
239. Id. at ¶ 20 (―The Appeals Chamber considers that the 98 bis Ruling in this case
constitutes a significant enough change in circumstance to warrant the renewed and explicit
consideration by the Trial Chamber of the risk of flight posed by the accused pursuant to
Rule 65(B) of the Rules.‖).
240. Id. at ¶ 21 (holding that the accused did not set forth ―sufficiently compelling‖
humanitarian justifications for release).
241. In the Pusic Appeals Chamber decision, reached by a different panel of judges, the
majority stated:
Because Rule 65(B) of the Rules does not require ‗sufficiently compelling‘
humanitarian reasons for provisional release, this Bench understands the Prlic
Decision of 11 March 2008 to have ruled that it is only when a Trial Chamber,
having considered all the circumstances of the case and the impact of the
significant change of circumstances constituted by the 98 bis decision, cannot
exclude the existence of flight risk or danger, that ―sufficiently compelling‖
humanitarian reasons, coupled with necessary and sufficient measures to alleviate
any flight risk or danger, can constitute a basis for resolving uncertainty and doubt
in favour of provisional release.
Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6,
Reasons for Decision on Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision Relative a la
Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L‘accuse Pusic‖, ¶ 15 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the

CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1

46

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1

indeed amounted to an additional requirement to the other Rule 65(B)
requirements (the absence of flight or danger) after the 98 bis stage.242 The
Appeals Chamber also added a requirement that the duration of the release
be proportional to the circumstance warranting the release—‖for example,
the need to visit a seriously ill family member in the hospital would justify
provisional release of a sufficient time to visit the family member‖ and no
longer.243 This requirement flips the international human rights notion of
proportionality—that the measure should be no more restrictive than
necessary to assure that a defendant appear for trial and pose no danger—
on its head.244
Various judges objected to the new ―sufficiently compelling
humanitarian circumstances‖ requirement in dissents on the basis that it is
absent from the rule; it elides the distinction between the standard for those
already convicted and those who merely stand accused and thereby
contravenes the presumption of innocence; and essentially adds back into
the rule the old ―exceptional circumstances‖ requirement.245 Judge
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 23, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf (emphasis added).
242. See Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-0474-AR65.7, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal from Decision Relative a la Demande de
Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L’accuse Petkovic Dated 31 March 2008‖, ¶ 2 (Int‘l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 21, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tdec/en/080421.pdf; see also Prosecutor v. Popovic,
Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, Case Nos. IT-05-88-AR65.4 to
65.6, Decision on Consolidated Appeal Against Decision on Borovcanin‘s Motion for a
Custodial Visit and Decisions on Gvero‘s and Miletic‘s Motions for Provisional Release
During the Break in the Proceedings, ¶ 24 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May
15, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/acdec/en/080515.pdf; Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic,
Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s
Appeal from Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L’Accuse
Prlic dated 7 April 2008‖, ¶ 16 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080425.pdf
243. Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.7, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s
Appeal from Decision relative a la demande de mise en liberte provisoire de l‘accuse
Petkovic dated 31 March 2008,‖ ¶ 17 (Apr. 21, 2008); Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No.
IT-04-74-AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal From Decision relative a la demande
de mise en liberte provisoire de l‘accuse Prlic Dated 7 April 2008,‖ ¶ 16 (Apr. 25, 2008).
244. See supra note 161 (describing the three-factor test for whether an international law
is proportionate: suitability, necessity, and reasonableness).
245. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.7, Decision on
―Prosecution‘s Appeal from Decision relative a la demade de mise en liberte provisoire de
l‘accuse Petkovic Dated 31 March 2008,‖ ¶ 4 (Apr. 21, 2008) (Guney, J., dissenting in part);
see also Prosecutor v. Popovic et al., Case Nos. IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, Decision on
Consolidated Appeal Against Decision on Borovcanin‘s Motion for a Custodial Visit and
Decisions on Gvero and Miletic‘s Motions for Provisional Release During the Break in the
Proceedings, ¶ 3 (May 15, 2008) (Liu, J., dissenting in part) (―As for what exactly
‗compelling humanitarian reasons‘ are, although they have not been defined by the
Majority, they seem to amount to the same as the previous ‗exceptional circumstances‘ in
practice.‖).
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Schomburg noted that it also would make little sense to defendants and
their families to, on the one hand, be told that a Trial Chamber ―excludes
the risk of flight and the risk of suppression of evidence and nevertheless in
the same decision exercises its discretion by ordering the ongoing
deprivation of liberty in the UNDU after the expiration of release for a
‗fixed period.‘‖246 Finally, Judge Schomburg objected to the new rule
insofar as it appeared to be creating a new type of ―temporary release‖
before a judgment of guilt or innocence neither provided for in the rule, nor
seen in domestic jurisdictions.247
These new judicially-created rules resulted in a spate of filings centering
on the highly factual inquiry into circumstances warranting release.
Ultimately, the filings turned into a fight over the sickness and propinquity
of relatives.248 After failing before, defendants beefed up their cases for
humanitarian circumstances. When the Appeals Chamber overturned an
246. Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on
Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision de l‘accuse Pusic‖ Issued on 14 April 2008,
¶ 10 (Apr. 23, 2008) (Schomburg, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Schomburg noted
that he had answered this dilemma in a previous dissenting opinion in the Prlic case. Id.
¶ 10 n.12. Unfortunately, as the dissent is confidential, his solution will remain a mystery to
the public. See Email from Stuart Lester, Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Media
Office, to author (Sept. 10, 2009, 01:06 PDT) (on file with author).
247. Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on
Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision de l‘accuse Pusic‖ Issued on 14 April 2008,
¶ 1 (Apr. 23, 2008) (Schomburg, J., dissenting). In his dissent from the Pusic Appeals
Judgment, Judge Schomburg contended that these humanitarian releases, which he dubbed
―temporary release,‖ are ―an artefact [sic] in principle not foreseen in criminal proceedings‖
in either the law of the ICTY or in domestic jurisdictions other than for convicted persons.
Id. at ¶ 1. Citing time constraints in issuing the decision, Schomburg gave only one German
source for the proposition that ―temporary release‖ did not exist in domestic jurisdictions.
Id. at ¶ 1 n.1. In fact, the U.S. federal system provides at least one example of a jurisdiction
that allows for temporary release. The U.S. Bail Reform Act allows for ―temporary release
of the person, in the custody of a United States marshal or another appropriate person, to the
extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be necessary for preparation of the
person‘s defense or for another compelling reason.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (2006).
248. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, &
Pandurevic, Case Nos. IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, Decision on Consolidated Appeal Against
Decision on Borovcanin‘s Motion for a Custodial Visit and Decisions on Gvero‘s and
Miletic‘s Motions for Provisional Release During the Break in the Proceedings, ¶¶ 9, 26, 28
(Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 15, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/acdec/en/080515.pdf (deciding that a father‘s illness or
death does not justify provisional release); Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic,
Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal From
Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L’Accuse Prlic Dated 7
April 2008‖, ¶¶ 4–5 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080425.pdf (listing, specifically, the defendant‘s
father‘s gradual blindness, his father‘s surgery for cancer, his mother‘s health condition, and
his brother‘s liver transplant as humanitarian reasons supporting temporary release);
Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution‘s
Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision de l‘accuse Pusic‖ Issued on 14 April 2008, ¶ 11 (Apr.
23, 2008) (describing the ―ill-health of [] family members‖ as the second basis for the
accused‘s release).
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order releasing an accused because he had offered no humanitarian
circumstances justifying his release,249 not surprisingly, by the next court
break, he had found some humanitarian reasons to support his release.250
This back and forth on whether or not the humanitarian circumstances
were sufficiently compelling reflects the notion that ―motions for
provisional release are fact intensive and cases are considered on an
individual basis in light of the particular circumstances of the individual
accused.‖251
Case-specific factual inquiries on release are indeed
appropriate and consistent with human rights norms,252 but the ICTY‘s
focus on humanitarian circumstances has detracted from the bigger issue—
the defendant‘s right to liberty itself—which should mean release absent a
significant public interest in detaining him or her.
The focus on ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances‖ has
also engendered some rather bold defense motions. Deeming irrelevant the
fact that he had been on the lam for years, Vujadin Popovic sought release
on the basis of ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances.‖253
249. Gvero had argued that he should be released simply because he was neither a risk of
flight nor a danger. Prosecutor v. Prlic et al., Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for
Decision on Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision de l‘accuse Pusic‖ Issued on
14 April 2008, ¶¶ 23–24 (Apr. 23, 2008).
250. Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic,
Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Gvero‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 21 (Int‘l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
July
21,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/080721b.pdf (granting release based on
Gvero‘s poor health and that of his sister); see also Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic,
Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Gvero‘s
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 6–8 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec.
10, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/081210a.pdf (noting that Gvero submitted that
―his well-being has deteriorated during the course of proceedings‖ and that Gvero
―highlight[e]d that the Trial Chamber [wa]s approaching one of the most critical points in
the trial for Gvero, namely the presentation of his own case, and stresses the importance for
him to be able to participate in his own defense and more particularly, his ability to be in top
psychological condition during the course of his own case.‖) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
251. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74AR65.8, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal From Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise
en Liberte Provisoire de L’Accuse Prlic Dated 7 April 2008‖, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 25, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080425.pdf (explaining the factors that must be
considered in deciding whether the Rule 65(B) requirements have been met).
252. See W. v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 15 (1993) (stating that ―the
reasonable time cannot be assessed in abstracto,‖ but rather that ―the reasonableness of an
accused person‘s continued detention must be assessed in each case according to its special
features‖).
253. Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic,
Case No. IT-05-88-AR65.7, Decision on Vujadin Popovic‘s Interlocutory Appeal Against
the Decision on Popovic‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 3, 12 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 1, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/acdec/en/080701.pdf (appealing the Trial Chamber‘s
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Perhaps the most audacious motion was that of Milan Lukic. One month
after being convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes for
burning alive approximately 120 women, children, and elderly people;
killing several Bosnian-Muslim men; beating Bosnian-Muslim men in
detention; and killing a Bosnian-Muslim woman at point blank range,254
Lukic filed for release on compassionate grounds to allow him to visit his
―ailing and elderly parents‖ whom he had not seen since 1998.255 The
reason he had not seen his parents for seven years was that he was actively
evading arrest by the Tribunal before his arrest in Argentina in 2005.256 As
one member of the Office of the Prosecutor facetiously stated off the
record, ―[p]erhaps one could argue that conviction for crimes against
humanity is traumatic enough to be considered a factor supporting release
on humanitarian grounds?‖257
The ICTY‘s explanation for the heightened release standard post-98 bis
is also troubling in light of the presumption of innocence. The courts have
justified it based on the increased risk of flight, but one wonders whether
flight is really the issue. Indeed, four of the defendants in the case of
Prosecutor v. Prlic258 argued that it was hard to see how the Trial Chamber
98 bis finding against them could have affected their perceptions of the risk
of conviction since they had not made any Rule 98 bis submissions, which
indicated that they already believed they would not win on a motion for
judgment of acquittal after the prosecution rested.259 The language of the
decision denying him release to visit his ailing mother and arguing that ―his whereabouts
before his surrender to the Tribunal have no bearing on whether he currently poses a flight
risk‖).
254. See Prosecutor v. Lukic & Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement Summary For
Milan Lukic and Sredoje Lukic (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_Lukic_sredoje_Lukic/tjug/en/090720_judg_summary_en
.pdf (describing the court‘s findings on the defendant‘s involvement in crimes).
255. See Prosecutor v. Lukic and Lukic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Decision on Milan
Lukic‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Aug. 28, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/acdec/en/090828.pdf (arguing that
because his parents were ill, he ―‗should be entitled, at a minimum, to the same compassion‘
as that granted to other accused‖).
256. See id. at ¶ 6 (providing the Prosecution‘s reasons for opposing the defendant‘s
motion for provisional release).
257. Email from OTP lawyer, to author (July 30, 2009) (on file with author).
258. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74AR65.5, Decision on Prosecution‘s Consolidated Appeal Against Decisions to Provisionally
Release the Accused Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic and Coric, ¶¶ 14, 18 (Int‘l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080311.pdf.
259. Id. (mentioning that of the six defendants, Pusic and Coric were the only ones who
had moved for a judgment of acquittal). Likewise, in the Perisic case, the defense argued
that the ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds‖ did not apply since ―there [had
been] no Rule 98 bis submissions and consequently no pronouncements by the Trial
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Perisic Trial Chamber in rejecting the defense argument that the absence of
a 98 bis ruling made the ―sufficiently compelling humanitarian
circumstances‖ standard inapplicable supports this argument. It stated:
Rule 98bis is used when the Defence is of the view that there is no
evidence capable of supporting a conviction. The corollary is that when
the Defence does not use this provision, it is of the view that it does have
a case to answer.260

This language lends support to the notion that a defendant who presents
not Rule 98 bis submissions already believes that he or she has a case to
answer and would not be surprised by a judicial decision saying so.
Although the judges claimed otherwise, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the heightened standard reflects a sentiment about the
increased likelihood of conviction. In one dissent, Judge Schomburg stated
that the relevant inquiry was whether ―this specific 98 bis Ruling, which
dismissed [the defendant]‘s motion to enter a judgment for acquittal had an
effect on [the defendant]‘s readiness and willingness to appear again for
trial.‖261 However, in another, Judge Liu noted that the probability of
conviction plays a role in the provisional release decision.262
The great disparities in the strictness of the ―sufficiently compelling
humanitarian circumstances‖ requirement from trial chamber to trial
chamber appears to reflect the judges‘ profound ambivalence or perhaps
Chamber as to the potential guilt or innocence of the Accused.‖ Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case
No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 2 (Int‘l Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Mar.
31,
2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/100331.pdf.
260. Prosecutor v. Perisic, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perisic‘s Motion for
Provisional Release, ¶ 20 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/tdec/en/100331.pdf.
261. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision Relative
a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L‘Accuse Pusic‖, ¶ 5 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 23, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf
(Schomburg, J., dissenting) (finding that the Trial Chamber had failed to assess sufficiently
the potential change in Mr. Pusic‘s incentives to flee).
262. Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic, Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic,
Case Nos. IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, Decision on Consolidated Appeal Against Decision on
Borovcanin‘s Motion for a Custodial Visit and Decisions on Gvero‘s and Miletic‘s Motions
for Provisional Release During the Break in the Proceedings, ¶ 2 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former
Yugoslavia
May
15,
2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/acdec/en/080515.pdf (Liu, J., dissenting in part)
(stating ―like the Majority‘s new ‗compelling humanitarian reasons‘, the Trial Chambers in
determining the existence of ‗exceptional circumstances‘ considered the probability of a
conviction when they considered ‗whether there is reasonable suspicion that [an accused]
committed the crime or crimes charged‘‖ (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, &
Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release Filed by the
Accused Zejnil Delalic, ¶ 21 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 25, 1996),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/60925PR2.htm)).

CAROLINE DAVIDSON.OFFTOPRINTER 60.1

2010]

NO SHORTCUTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

51

disagreement about the propriety of letting defendants on trial for war
crimes out at all. In most instances, judges demand that defendants offer
humanitarian circumstances beyond the length of the trial and their
detention alone. However, the release of one accused, well after the 98 bis
decision, suggests that some judges are more disturbed by the lengthy
detention of accused during trial and are seeking to address the problem in
the only manner allowed by tribunal jurisprudence. Citing the Registrar‘s
Report on the problems associated with lengthy detention, the Prlic Trial
Chamber found that ―the long time spent in provisional detention and the
foreseeable length of the trial . . . constitute[d] a sufficiently compelling
humanitarian reason for granting [the defendant] provisional release.‖263
The Trial Chamber ordered the defendant‘s release over the month-long
summer court recess.264
D. Victims’ Rights and Provisional Release at the ICTY
The ICTY does not allow victims any participation rights.265 However,
the provisional release decisions reflect a concern over victims‘ rights to
protection and their interests generally.
The decision to require
―sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances‖ seems in no small
part motivated by concern for victims. Even though the rules of the ICTY
do not require judges to consider the interests of victims, the Appeals
Chamber has counseled judges to consider the prejudicial effects on
victims and witnesses living in the region to which the accused will be
released before granting release. The Appeals Chamber also has defined
broadly the interests of victims it seeks to protect:

263. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74-T,
Redacted Version of ―Decision on Slobodan Praljak‘s Motion for Provisional Release (2009
Summer Judicial Recess)‖, ¶¶ 32–34 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 25,
2009), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tdec/en/090525.pdf (citing the Registrar‘s Report
on Detention and noting that Praljak had been detained since the beginning of the
proceedings, which amounted to over three years, and that he had not been released for the
past year and a half, and concluding that, since ―in such a lengthy trial, the good physical
and mental health of the Accused is particularly important in ensuring that the proceedings
go forward smoothly and efficiently. . . . [A] short period spent with his relatives would help
ease the negative effects of lengthy detention on the Accused Praljak‖).
264. Id. at ¶ 34. The Trial Chamber noted that Praljak had been held in the UNDU since
the beginning of the proceedings and had not been provisionally released in a year and a
half. Id. at ¶ 31.
265. See DOAK, supra note 121, at 136 (―It has been suggested that the minimalist nature
of participatory rights granted to victims in the ad hoc tribunals is attributable to fears that
the presence of victims could cause undue delay in the trial process, thereby jeopardizing
the rights of the accused to be tried expeditiously.‖); see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 220
(citing ICTY and ICTR Rules Of Procedure 2 and noting that, unlike the ICC, the ad hoc
tribunals defined ―victims‖ very narrowly as persons ―against whom a crime over which the
Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly been committed‖).
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The perception that persons accused of international crimes are released,
for a prolonged period of time, after a decision that a reasonable trier of
fact could make a finding beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty (this being the meaning of a decision dismissing a Rule 98bis
motion), could have a prejudicial effect of victims and witnesses.266

In his dissent from the Pusic Appeals Decision, Judge Schomburg noted
that it is ―difficult for alleged victims and their relatives to comprehend that
alleged war criminals [are] permitted to be in the region whilst they would
expect him to answer his case before the International Tribunal.‖267
Judge Schomburg has articulated what seems to be a concern about the
effect of provisional release on the ―expressive‖ function of international
tribunals to condemn war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide
by releasing defendants who are on trial for such crimes. Arguing against
releasing defendants for court breaks, Judge Schomburg argued that such a
regime ―would in practical terms convey the impression, particularly to the
people in the States on the territory of the former Yugoslavia that accused
before the International Tribunal are let out on holidays.‖268 The worry is,
presumably, not only over victim dissatisfaction with the tribunal, but also
that this ―impression‖ risks sending the message of the insignificance of the
crimes and thus undermining the expressive function and the potential
transitional justice benefits of the trials. At the ICC, victims have voiced
the same concern.269 However, as discussed below in Part IV.5, the place
for sending the message on the gravity of the crimes is sentencing, not
release, where defendants are presumed innocent.

266. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74AR65.7, Decision on ―Prosecution‘s Appeal from Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise
en Liberte Provisoire de L‘Accuse Petkovic‖, ¶ 17 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 21, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tdec/en/080421.pdf (offering this explanation for the
―sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons‖ rule).
267. Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-04-74AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision Relative
a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L‘Accuse Pusic‖, ¶ 10 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 23, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf
(Schomburg,
J.,
dissenting)
(juxtaposing the interests and concerns of victims and their families with those of the
Accused and their families).
268. Id. at ¶ 17.
269. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 12, Judgment on the
appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ―Decision on the
release of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo‖, ¶ 28 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.iclklamberg.com/Caselaw/DRC/Dyilo/Appeals/1487.pdf
(noting
victims‘
argument that the release of the defendant could ―create the impression that the conscription,
enlistment or use of child soldiers is not a serious offence‖); see also id. at ¶ 9 (Pikis, J.,
dissenting) (noting the victims‘ arguments against Lubanga‘s release including that it would
―cultivate a sense of impunity on the part of perpetrators of grave crimes‖).
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III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF PROVISIONAL RELEASE AT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS
A number of reforms could help international tribunals better serve as a
model of respect for human rights. Below, I evaluate a series of measures
in light of the human rights issues identified above, including the rights to
be presumed innocent, to bail (or at least a bail hearing), to liberty and
security of the person, and to a speedy and fair trial, as well as victims‘
rights. I also assess the measures against the balance struck on these rights
by the ECtHR and national courts. No one measure does away with the
human rights problems associated with decisions on provisional release,
but each represents a step in the right direction.
A. Streamlined and Possibly Sequential Trials
1.

Streamlined trials
As many have recognized, whether any other reforms of provisional
release occur, ―speedier and shorter trials‖ would help address the human
rights concerns associated with the lengthy detention before conviction of
international defendants.270 The ICTY has already implemented a number
of procedural changes in an attempt to reduce the length of trials. It has
hired ad hoc judges and given judges more flexible assignments.271
Controversially, it has changed its rules to allow documentary evidence and
out-of-court statements in lieu of in-court testimony.272 Judges are
increasingly limiting the number of witnesses and length of testimony
allowed.273
270. E.g., Prosecutor v. Prlic, Case No. IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on
Prosecution‘s Urgent Appeal Against ―Decision Relative a la Demande de Mise en Liberte
Provisoire de l‘accuse Pusic‖, ¶¶ 10–11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr.
23, 2008) (Schomburg, J., dissenting)
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf (suggesting that the answer to the
dilemma of detention during long trials lays in having expeditious trials, not in releasing
defendants); see also WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 245 (advocating shorter trials);
Iain Bonomy, The Reality of Conducting a War Crimes Trial, 5 J. INT‘L. CRIM. JUST. 348–51
(2007) (discussing the need for strict trial management by judges and a lesser reliance on the
adversarial system to make international trials more efficient).
271. WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 245.
272. See ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 253–54 (noting that the flexibility should help
address the problem of lengthy trials).
273. Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 699; see also Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case
No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on the Application of Rule 73 bis, ¶ 2 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/091008.pdf
(noting that the Chamber had ordered the Prosecution to make written submissions on
reducing the size of the trial and that the Prosecution had reduced the number of witnesses,
locations, and the estimated time needed for its examination-in-chief).
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There is also an increasing recognition that the mega-trials, in which
many defendants and/or charges are joined together, may make speedy
trials extremely difficult to deliver. Mega-trials make it hard to get cases
ready for trial and, ultimately, to complete the trial quickly.274
Even if mega-trials increase efficiency for a tribunal as a whole and
better judicial control can make them shorter, for any given accused, being
a part of a multi-defendant mega-trial inevitably leads to a longer trial than
he or she otherwise would have had. Not all prosecution evidence will
relate to all accused. Moreover, each defendant may wish to cross-examine
separately prosecution witnesses and call witnesses in his or her defense.275
If all defendants are detained during trial, this effect necessarily makes for
longer detention. Thus, unless release during trial becomes a more realistic
option, the mega-trial seems to pose a grave challenge to the human rights
of defendants.
Backing the tribunal‘s guarantee of speedy rights with rules with teeth
also would help to push prosecutors to engage in the necessary
streamlining. Tribunals should consider instituting a speedy trial clock
whereby cases must be completed within a certain period of time, which
would reduce the length of detention for those detained for trial.276
Overall, streamlining trials scores well in a human rights evaluation.
Smaller cases help to ensure that the defendant receives a speedy trial.277
274. See Bibas & Burke-White, supra note 11, at 699 (noting that even though the court
statutes provide a right to a speedy trial, international defendants can have waits of several
years before their trials are concluded). It bears noting though that some multi-defendant
mega-trials have been completed reasonably quickly and the experience and style of the
judges may be a more critical factor than the number of defendants or charges. See PATRICIA
M. WALD, TYRANTS ON TRIAL: KEEPING ORDER IN THE COURTROOM 20 (2009),
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publ
ications/tyrants_20090911/tyrants_20090911.pdf (noting that the Omarska trial with five
defendants lasted only 113 trial days); Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pevkovic, Lazarevic,
Lukic, & Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87, Case Information Sheet, 5,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/cis/en/cis_sainovic_al_en.pdf
(showing that the Milutinovic case, now known as the Sainovic case since Milutinovic‘s
acquittal, with six defendants, lasted less than two years).
275. The ICTY mega-trials bear out this possibility.
276. In the United States federal system, for example, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974
requires that trial begin ―within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the
information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial
officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.‖ 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(c)(1) (2006).
277. See Prosecutor v. Prlic, Stojic, Praljak, Petkovic, Coric, & Pusic, Case No. IT-0474-AR65.6, ―Decision de L‘accuse a la Demande de Mise en Liberte Provisoire de L‘accuse
Pusic‖, ¶ 11 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 23, 2008) (Schomburg, J.,
dissenting),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acdec/en/080423.pdf (noting that an accused has the right
to a speedy trial). Judge Schomburg argued that, therefore, ―periods where a Trial Chamber
does not conduct hearings must be as short as possible, taking into account only the parties‘
needs for preparing their cases but not the wish of the accused for ―temporary release.‖ Id.
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The prosecution and defense will need less time to get ready for trial, and
the trial should take less time. The streamlined trial does not do away with
fair trial concerns about a defendant‘s ability to prepare a defense while
incarcerated, but it addresses the problems associated with lengthy
detention discussed above.
Bringing fewer charges and trying fewer defendants at once will improve
compliance with other core defendants‘ rights. Since the presumption of
innocence and the right to liberty go away if a defendant is convicted in a
final judgment on the merits and given prison time, the shorter the trial
before a conviction, the less time a defendant is detained (even if all
defendants are detained for trial) while he or she is presumed innocent.
Despite the defendants‘ rights benefits of shorter trials, the ECtHR has
been very deferential to national courts in their decisions joining
defendants and charges.278 In Neumeister v. Austria,279 for example, the
ECtHR seemed reluctant to impeach Austria‘s decision to join the
defendant‘s case with those of several others even though ―[t]he course of
the investigation would probably have been accelerated had the Applicant‘s
case been severed from those of his co-accused.‖280 The court reasoned
that ―nothing suggests that such a severance would here have been
compatible with the good administration of justice.‖281 The court may have
shown less deference had the defendant still been detained.282
Nevertheless, streamlining cases has its drawbacks. Severing the trials
of accused whose conduct is related and reducing the number of counts and
incidents charged against each individual accused means that trials are
unlikely to create a full historical record of events.283 As part of
278. E.g., Neumeister v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 (1968).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See STEYTLER, supra note 61, at 146 (citing Stogemuller v. Austria, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 40, (1969)) (arguing that where an accused is detained pending trial, the court and
the prosecution should employ special diligence to ensure the expeditious completion of the
case). But see Ferrari-Bravo v. Italy, App. No. 9627/81, Eur. Comm‘n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
15, 39–40 (1984) (finding no violation of Article 5(3) for detention on remand of 4 years
and 11 months and that the considerable period of detention on remand involved in that case
was ―inextricably bound up with the duration of the criminal proceedings themselves,‖
which was enlarged ―due to the fact that the judicial authorities decided to combine the
various proceedings in a single trial, which assumed substantial proportions in
consequence‖).
283. See Michael P. Scharf & Ahran Kang, Errors and Missteps: Key Lessons the Iraqi
Special Tribunal Can Learn from the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 911,
919–20 (2005) (arguing that the Iraqi Tribunal should avoid ―mega trials‖ dealing with
events ―occurring in many places and spanning over long periods of time‖ and conceding
that doing so ―will not help to establish a comprehensive historic record of the atrocities
committed under the regime of Hussein,‖ but maintaining that other institutions like truth
commissions would be better suited to doing so).
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prioritizing the aim of promoting respect for human rights and the rule of
law through international criminal justice, this cost is one that tribunals
may have to accept. Other mechanisms, such as truth commissions, which
are typically considered better means of creating a historical record, should
be used to complement international criminal trials as a means of creating a
historical record.284
Further, streamlining cases by dropping charges or factual allegations
against defendants may distort sentencing. Although one might think that
the penalty for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide would
always be life imprisonment, often defendants receive significantly shorter
sentences than they would likely receive for murder in many domestic
jurisdictions.285 Since conviction of an international crime usually does not
mean a life sentence, the fewer crimes charged, arguably, the lower the
sentence a defendant may face. For example, the Appeals Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic286 found that its reversal of his
convictions for a few shelling incidents reduced ―Milosevic‘s overall
culpability‖ because fewer victims could be imputed to him even though
the findings behind the reversal ―d[id] not change the fact that the entire
population of Sarajevo was the victim of the crime of terror committed
under Milosevic‘s command.‖287 A defendant‘s sentence may only reflect
the gravity of his or her actions if the full scope of his or her activities is
presented to the court.
Finally, streamlining cases may produce other human rights costs by
reducing opportunities for victims to participate in trials.288 The vocal
opposition of victims‘ groups to the streamlining of the case against
Radovan Karadzic demonstrates that victims may not be pleased with this

284. See supra note 37 (noting scholars‘ arguments that truth commissions are a better
means of creating a historical record).
285. See Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 56, at 688–89 (stating that ―[i]t appears that
some ICTY sentencing Chambers apply either a remarkably low formula to calculate the
length of time to be spent in prison in relation to the total quantum of human suffering
caused, or afford quite extraordinary weight to mitigating factors‖); see also DRUMBL, supra
note 28, at 154–55 (explaining that ―at both the national and international levels, sentences
for multiple international crimes are generally not lengthier than what national jurisdictions
award for a single serious ordinary crime‖).
286. Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Judgement (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 12, 2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/acjug/en/091112.pdf.
287. Id. at ¶ 335.
288. See ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 221 (noting that ―one of the central traits of a system
that does not allow for direct participation of victims in the process is that the Prosecutor
may, albeit involuntarily, instrumentalize victims. In other words, there is the risk that
victims will be allowed to participate only in so far as their claims are useful to the overall
strategy of Prosecution‖).
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reform.289 A member of the group ―Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa
Enclaves‖ told reporters that ―victims will no longer appear as witnesses at
trials. We will ignore them. We will not take part in the work of the
Tribunal. They know they cannot go on without our help. So, they should
then release Karadzic.‖290 Then again, long trials may not serve victims‘
interests in justice since the longer the trials, the fewer defendants can be
tried and, at least in some cases, defendants may die before judgment.
Moreover, mechanisms other than long trials, such as explicit participation
rights, are a more targeted and effective means of addressing victim
participation.
2.

Sequential trials
Even though the Saddam Hussein trial is considered ―one of the messier
trials in legal history,‖291 its approach of tackling incidents one by one is
worth considering. The issue of bail and its attendant human rights
implications, including the presumption of innocence, disappear once a
person is convicted of a crime, assuming that his or her sentence is
sufficiently long to allow for a trial on remaining indictments. 292 Holding
sequential trials also addresses the concerns about victims‘ rights to
participation and to a remedy and about inadequate sentencing, since more
charges and incidents can ultimately be adjudicated than if they are
dropped altogether.

289. Several hundred members of victims‘ groups protested in The Hague and Sarajevo,
and burned in effigy various ICTY figures. E.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Victims Groups
Unhappy With Prospect of a (Reasonably) Manageable Karadzic Trial, OPINIOJURISBLOG,
Sept. 17, 2009, http://opiniojuris.org/2009/09/17/victims-groups-unhappy-with-prospect-ofa-reasonably-successful-karadzic-trial/; BalkanInsight.com, Victims Protest Hague
Tribunal’s
Work,
Sept.
17,
2009
[hereinafter
BalkanInsight.com],
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/22275.
290. BalkanInsight.com, supra note 289.
291. See PATRICIA M. WALD, TYRANTS ON TRIAL: KEEPING ORDER IN THE COURTROOM
20 (2009),
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/international_justice/articles_publications/publ
ications/tyrants_20090911/tyrants_20090911.pdf (noting that the Omarska trial with five
defendants lasted only 113 trial days); Prosecutor v. Sainovic, Ojdanic, Pevkovic, Lazarevic,
Lukic, & Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87, Case Information Sheet, 5,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/cis/en/cis_sainovic_al_en.pdf (noting that the
Milutinovic case, now known as the Sainovic case since Milutinovic‘s acquittal, with six
defendants, lasted less than two years).
292. Of course, Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death and executed after his first trial,
so no further trials occurred. See Galbraith, supra note 234, at 133 n.199 (noting that
―Kurds were frustrated that Hussein was executed for a conviction in relation to atrocities
against 148 Shiites before the completion of his trial for atrocities committed against vast
numbers of Kurds during the Anfal campaign‖). Since the international tribunals allow for a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment, further trials will be possible. See, e.g., Rome
Statute, supra note 59, art. 77 (providing for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment).
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However, this proposal may raise other human rights problems for
prosecution of the later charges. If international tribunals give teeth to their
guarantees of a speedy trial and follow the ECHR‘s conception of the right
to a speedy trial—the right to have the process against one concluded
expeditiously—sequential trials may run afoul of the right to a speedy
trial.293 Issuing new charges only once a trial nears the end may be a way
around this problem, but it raises other concerns about practicality and the
fairness of the trial associated with pre-indictment delay.
B. Revamping the Release Inquiry
The inquiry into risk of flight and danger must be reworked for tribunals
to reflect better international human rights norms. This effort need not
throw out the risk of flight or danger inquiries altogether, but rather must
address the issues at their margin, such as the extent of judicial discretion,
judicial rule-making, and the burden of proof.
1.

Limiting the unbridled discretion of courts to detain
Judges‘ discretion must be limited. Judges should not be able to detain
defendants if the grounds for detention set out in their tribunals‘ rules or
statutes are not met. Marking a significant human rights improvement over
the ICTY, ICC judges have much less discretion on release than do ICTY
judges. At least in theory, if the requirements for detention are met, 294 an
accused must be detained. If not, he or she must be released.295
Limiting judicial discretion comports with the jurisprudence of the
ECtHR and national courts, which condemn boundless discretion of courts
293. See Burke-White, supra note 53, at 84 (explaining that proactively encouraging
prosecutions in domestic jurisdictions could save the ICC resources it needs to conduct
investigations and prosecutions).
294. The ICC provides for provisional detention where ―there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and . . .
[t]he arrest of the person appears necessary: (i) To ensure the person‘s appearance at trial,
(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the court
proceedings, or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the
commission of that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and
which arises out of the same circumstances.‖ Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 58(1), 60.
295. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (OA 7), Judgment on
the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I
entitled ―Decision sur la demande de mise en liberte provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo‖,
¶ 134 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Feb. 13, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc248155.PDF
(―[T]he decision on continued detention or release pursuant to article 60(2) read with article
58(1) of the Statute is not of a discretionary nature.‖); see also Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo,
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 2, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against PreTrial Chamber II‘s ―Decision on the Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo‖, ¶ 59
(Int‘l Crim. Ct. Dec. 2, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc787666.pdf (recalling
the decision of Prosecutor v. Dyilo to acknowledge that Article 58(1) must be read with
Article 60(2)).
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on release.296 Restricting judges to detention only where provided by the
rules also increases transparency in the decision-making process on release,
which supports the defendant‘s right to a fair trial.297
2. Eliminating the “Sufficiently Compelling Humanitarian
Circumstances” Requirement
The ICTY should do away with and other tribunals should not adopt the
―sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances‖ requirement.298 This
measure again increases transparency of the decision-making process on
release and places the focus back on the central question recognized by the
ECtHR and domestic courts—whether there is a valid public interest in
detaining the defendant that outweighs the defendant‘s liberty interest—
rather than on whether the defendant has some special liberty interest
stemming from ―humanitarian circumstances,‖ like a sick relative.299
To the extent that judges find that their rules on detention and release are
inadequate, they should adhere to the normal procedures for changing
them. Adherence to the rules of the tribunal, again, increases transparency
and is and appears fairer than when rules are created for a particular case.
3. Placing the burden of persuasion to show the defendant is a flight risk
or danger on the prosecution
Arguably, to comport with international human rights norms, the burden
should be on the prosecution to prove risk of flight and danger. Dissenting
from a provisional release decision, Judge Robinson contended that the
ICTY‘s Rule 65(B) should be read to place the burden of proof regarding
flight risk or danger on the prosecution, but his view did not prevail. 300 In a
commentary on Judge Robinson‘s dissent, one scholar instead proposed
amending the rule to explicitly place the burden of proving risk of
nonappearance or danger to the community on the prosecutor.301
296. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
297. See AMANN, supra note 120, at 212, 214–15 (noting that judicial independence,
which can enhance impartiality, includes following procedure, and that impartiality and
transparency help ensure that decisions are fair).
298. See supra notes 239–240 and accompanying text (describing the holding in Prlic).
299. See supra notes 248–250 and accompanying text.
300. Judge Robinson also maintained that the Trial Chamber lacked the discretion to
refuse to grant provisional release unless the prosecution could demonstrate that the accused
would not appear for trial and would pose a danger. DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1442
(discussing Prosecutor v. Krajisnik & Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on
Momcilo Krajisnik‘s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2001) (Robinson, J., dissenting)).
301. Id. at 1457. Unlike Robinson, DeFrank argues that the Trial Chamber should retain
the discretion to deny release even if the accused is neither a risk of flight nor a danger,
which allows the Trial Chamber to ―serve[] as the final protector against risky or ill-advised
provisional releases.‖ Id. at 1461.
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Shifting the burden of proof to the prosecution addresses several aspects
of the defendants‘ rights concerns about provisional release at the ICTY.
Consistent with the strictest formulation of the presumption of innocence, a
defendant would not be put in a position of having to prove anything—
including the absence of a risk of flight or danger.302 As noted above,
putting the burden of proof on the prosecution to show factors warranting
detention is consistent with human rights jurisprudence at the ECtHR and
in some national jurisdictions.303 Further, by making release more likely,
the proposal promotes defendants‘ liberty and fair trial rights (since
detention makes defending oneself harder).
This approach may raise problems for victims‘ rights to protection and
participation. By making release more likely, this measure may jeopardize
victims‘ rights to protection.304 Arguably, if the inquiry is meaningful, it
should not. To the extent that there is a danger to victims that no
conditions for release can obviate, a defendant should not be released. If
prosecutors do their job in collecting and presenting evidence to show a
danger or a flight risk, victims should still be protected. By forcing the
prosecution to beef up its case on danger, the proposal also could increase
victim participation in release decisions by making witness testimony more
critical at this stage.305 However, the difficulty in providing concrete
evidence that a defendant poses a risk of flight or danger may make shifting
the burden of proof problematic.
The middle ground staked out by the United States federal system may
provide a human rights-compatible compromise. Pursuant to this approach,
the defendant is presumed to present a flight risk or danger in certain
serious cases, but the presumption is rebuttable.306 The prosecution still
bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant poses a flight risk or danger.307 This approach avoids running
afoul of the presumption of innocence‘s implication that the defendant
should not have the burden of proving anything and is consistent with
ECtHR precedent.

302. See supra note 68 (discussing the presumption of innocence and the burden of
proof on issues not related to the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence).
303. Id.
304. See DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1460 (noting that ―the Tribunal only prosecutes
‗serious violations of international humanitarian law‘‖).
305. However, the victims‘ participation would still be defined in a conventional, nonvictim-focused manner by placing control in the hands of the prosecution. See supra note
288.
306. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006).
307. Id. § 3142(f).
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C. Compensation
International tribunals should make explicit the right to compensation for
unlawful detention and recognize the right to compensation for lengthy
detention following an acquittal.
Although the ICTY‘s statute and rules are silent on the possibility of
compensation after unlawful detention, compensation for unlawful
detention appears to be a tool that is increasingly available at international
courts. As noted above, the Appeals Chamber has held that a defendant
who is unlawfully detained and acquitted is entitled to compensation.308
The ECCC arrived at the same proposed remedy for the unlawful eightyear pre-trial detention of defendant Kaing Guek Eav‘s (commonly known
as ―Duch‖).309
The ICC has formalized the right to compensation for unlawful detention
through Article 85 of its statute.310 The ICC‘s rules provide that a Chamber
of three judges, with no prior involvement in the accused‘s case, determine
the lawfulness of the detention and the amount of compensation. 311 To
determine compensation, the Chamber must consider: ―the consequences of
the grave and manifest miscarriage of justice on the personal, family, social
and professional situation of the person filing the request.‖312 Still though,
the ICC provides no compensation to defendants who were detained
lawfully, but were acquitted after lengthy detention.
International courts should consider providing compensation for lengthy
detention if a defendant is acquitted.313 Compensation mitigates some of
308. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor‘s
Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 75 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Mar. 31, 2000),
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/Case%5CEnglish%5CBarayagwiza%5Cdeci
sions%5Cdcs20000331.pdf; see also ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 256–57 (discussing the
Appeals Chamber‘s decision in Barayagwiza).
See also supra notes
301–03 (discussing Baraygwiza).
309. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias ―Duch‖, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC,
Decision on Request for Release, ¶¶ 28–30, 35, 37 (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of
Cambodia June 15, 2009),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/353/E39_5_EN.pdf; see also Beth Van
Schaack, Pre-Trial Detention Before the ECCC:
The Continuing Saga,
INTLAWGRRLSBLOG, June 17, 2009, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2009/06/pre-trialdetention-before-eccc.html (discussing Duch‘s detention by the Cambodian military court
and the ECCC‘s ruling).
310. See Rome Statute, supra note 59, art. 85(1) (providing that ―[a]nyone who has been
the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation‖);
ZAPPALA, supra note 3, at 74–75 (noting that the ad hoc tribunals lacked such a provision);
Gordon, supra note 139, at 664 (citing Article 85, which affords victims of unlawful arrest
or detention the right of compensation).
311. ICC Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rules 173–75; see also ZAPPALA, supra
note 3, at 75 (noting the Rules have separated the proceedings to determine unlawfulness
and compensation).
312. ICC Rules Of Procedure, supra note 184, Rule 175.
313. See Johan David Michels, Compensating Acquitted Defendants For Detention
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the harm done to a defendant‘s rights through lengthy detention followed
by an acquittal.314 It acknowledges the deprivation of his or her right to
liberty and provides redress for the lost time.315 It also can fold in a
measure of accountability for excessively lengthy trials by increasing the
compensation based on the duration of the detention.
However,
compensation does little to address the fair trial problems associated with
detention before and during trial and, of course, cannot give back lost
liberty. Although victims may feel that paying a defendant compounds the
injustice done by an acquittal,316 compensation in no way undermines the
victims‘ rights to protection or participation.
D. Recognizing Victims’ Rights
To reflect the legitimacy of victims‘ rights among the panoply of human
rights associated with criminal trials, the rules of provisional release should
explicitly address victims‘ rights. At the ICTY, victims‘ rights to
protection are already largely addressed in the danger or future crime prong
of the release inquiry.317 Courts should continue to examine carefully
potential danger to victims in releasing international defendants. In
addition, victims should be given some participation rights in release
decisions. Embracing this emerging norm, both the ICC and the ECCC
have afforded victims the right to participate in release decisions in some
manner.318
Before International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 407, 408 (2010) (arguing that
there is no human right to compensation after an acquittal at international criminal courts,
but advocating a strict liability regime whereby acquitted defendants are compensated upon
acquittal for policy reasons); see also Schomburg, supra note 6, at 25–26, 28 (advocating
compensation for acquitted defendants detained for protracted periods of time).
314. Michels, supra note 313, at 418 (stating that compensation may give acquitted
accused a sense of ―moral satisfaction‖).
315. Michels, supra note 313, at 417 (explaining that an acquitted person has paid
society with pre-trial detention but he does not owe society any debt because he was not
convicted, and therefore, society will be unjustly enriched if he is not compensated).
316. The angry reactions to the five year sentence of one defendant and acquittal of
another in the Mrksic case in 2007, in which defendants had been accused of participating in
killing 200 patients from the Vukovar hospital, might well have been even worse had the
defendants been compensated for their lost time. Croatian anger at Vukovar verdict:
Croatia reacted angrily at verdicts pronounced by the UN war crimes tribunal in The
Hague in the cases of three former Yugoslav Army officers, BBC NEWS, Sept. 28, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7017758.stm. For information on the case generally, see the
ICTY‘s main page regarding the Mrksic case, The Cases: Mrksic et al. (IT-95-13/1)
“Vukovar Hospital”, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/case/mrksic/4 (last visited July 17, 2010).
317. See DeFrank, supra note 20, at 1431 (noting that Rule 65(B) still requires the
defense to show that the defendant would not pose a danger to victims if released).
318. See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 2, Judgment on
the appeal of the Prosecutor against Pre-Trial Chamber II‘s ―Decision on the Interim
Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of
Belgium, the Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of
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Recognizing victims‘ rights to participate does not mean giving victims
carte blanche to decide release. Rather, they are given an opportunity to
give their views. It is the court‘s decision, not the victims‘ submissions,
that must be ―sober and objective.‖ As a practical matter, courts may adopt
any number of procedural measures to keep victims from introducing more
delay into the process. For example, limiting victim participation to written
submissions may represent a way to prevent delay in the proceedings.319
The victims should have an opportunity to be heard, but not to take over the
show.
In addition, as Jonathan Doak puts it, courts are used to balancing
competing rights and there is no reason to assume that weighing victims‘
rights against a defendant presents challenges any greater than weighing
the state‘s rights against a defendant‘s rights, which courts do all the time
in the provisional release context.320
Further, since victims‘ submissions should be limited to the inquiry at
hand—the risk of flight, danger or other factor set out in the tribunal‘s
statute or rules—express participation rights may in fact improve
defendants‘ chances. It avoids judicial speculation on powerful if nebulous
concerns about victims‘ ―perceptions‖ and interests that appear to have
influenced the ICTY‘s decisions requiring ―sufficiently compelling
humanitarian circumstances‖ for release.321

Germany, the Italian Republic, and the Republic of South Africa‖, ¶¶ 27–28 (Int‘l Crim. Ct.
Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc787666.pdf (permitting the victims to present their
submissions in the appeal); Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA
12, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I
entitled ―Decision on the release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo‖, ¶¶ 27–30 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Oct.
21, 2008),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578365.pdf (permitting victims to raise arguments);
see also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional
Detention Appeals, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 116, 119 (2009) (citing Prosecutor v. Nuon, Case
No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC01), Decision on Civil Party Participation in
Provisional Detention Appeals (Extraordinary Chambers in the Cts. of Cambodia Mar. 20,
2008),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/courtDoc/53/PTC_decision_civil_party_nuon_chea
_C11_53_EN.pdf) (describing the decision of the ECCC in Prosecutor v. Nuon which
allowed victims to participate in the appeals of release decisions).
319. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on the
Interim Release of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶¶ 15, 30 (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc727230.pdf (describing the submissions ofby victim representatives
regarding the victims‘ position on Bemba‘s interim release).
320. DOAK, supra note 121, at 247–48.
321. See supra text accompanying note 266.
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E. Measures to Make Release Feasible
The difficult question—are we willing to let defendants accused of the
heinous crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes out
on provisional release—has already been answered in the affirmative. At
the ICTY and the ICC, defendants have been released before trial and
during breaks in their trials.322 The leap to allowing them to remain free
during trial seems a philosophically small, if logistically complicated, one.
If defendants are to be released during trial, then some practical matters
must be addressed. As long as international tribunals are far from the
defendants‘ homes,323 defendants must find a place to stay. If they have the
funds to rent an apartment in the host country, then they should be
permitted to do so.324 ICTY decisions seldom addressed the issue of cost in
releasing defendants to their home countries pre-trial or during court
breaks.325 When they did, courts ordered the home country to bear the cost
of transporting the defendant from Schiphol airport in the Netherlands.326
322. E.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Decision on
Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶¶ 1, 24 (Int‘l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/071214.pdf (granting Haradinaj‘s motion for
provisional release during a court recess).
323. It seems that they often will be. With cases involving defendants from all over the
world, the ICC faces the problems of distance. Moreover, ad hoc tribunals appear not to be
a thing of the past. The Lebanon tribunal, a mixed international and Lebanese tribunal, is
just now setting up operations in The Hague. See SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON, THE
STL SIX MONTHS ON:
A BIRD‘S EYE VIEW 1 (2009), http://www.stltsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/presidents_reports/SixMonthReport_En.pdf (describing
the activities of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in its first six months and its next steps).
324. In the ICTY‘s one instance of house arrest in lieu of pre-trial detention at the
UNDU for the first defendant to voluntarily surrender to the tribunal, Tihomir Blaskic, the
defendant, bore the costs of detention. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision
on the Motion of the Defence Seeking Modification to the Conditions of Detention of
General Blaskic, ¶ 1 (Int‘l Cirm. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 17, 1996); see also
WALD & MARTINEZ, supra note 20, at 235. Blaskic was ordered to return to the UNDU for
trial. Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT‘L. L. 57, 78 (1999).
325. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Balaj, & Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T,
Decision on Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 24 (Int‘l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Dec.
14,
2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tdec/en/071214.pdf
(discussing
the
various
responsibilities of the accused, the Registrar and security officers of the tribunal and
UNMIK in transfer of Haradinaj to and from Kosovo, but not mentioning costs).
326. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion
for Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (ordering the FRY and Talic to
bear jointly all expenses necessary for Talic‘s transport from Schiphol airport in the
Netherlands to Belgrade and back); see also Prosecutor v. Popovic, Beara, Nikolic,
Borovcanin, Miletic, Gvero, & Pandurevic, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Gvero‘s
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 26(c) (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July
21, 2008),
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This funding mechanism worked for the defendants before the ICTY, who
still enjoyed popular support in their home countries, but has been and will
continue to prove problematic for those, like the Rwandan defendants, who
do not.327
International tribunals must address the matter of housing for defendants
who cannot afford to pay for accommodations in the host country. The
tribunal should either provide some dormitory where defendants can live or
it should pay for modest accommodations. Released defendants should be
allowed considerably greater freedom of movement than the ICTY‘s
detention center.
Of course, this dormitory or tribunal-funded housing option runs the risk
of being perceived as an agreeable UN-funded holiday by those back in the
regions from which the defendants come, who may be living in even more
modest accommodations themselves. As noted above, the facilities in
which ICTY and ICC defendants are detained, dubbed the ―Hague Hilton,‖
have already attracted bad press for being too pleasant for alleged war
criminals and genocidaires.328
This perception risks undermining the tribunals‘ expressive function of
condemning the crimes for which the defendants are charged. However,
defendants have an incentive to behave in a respectful manner. Should
they be convicted, their conduct while on release may be taken into
consideration in sentencing.329
Moreover, the time for expressing
condemnation of the crimes is at sentencing, not through detention before a
conviction.
Another significant obstacle is the willingness of the host country to
have international criminal defendants loose on its soil. Early in the
ICTY‘s existence, the Netherlands stated that an accused who is released to
the Netherlands during a trial must apply for a residence permit.330 More
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/080721b.pdf (requiring Serbia to pay for the
travel expenses as well as accommodations and security); Prosecutor v. Stanisic &
Simatovic, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on Provisional Release, ¶ 5(d) (Int‘l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia May 26, 2008),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stanisic_simatovic/tdec/en/080526_1.pdf (ordering Serbia to
assume responsibility ―for all expenses concerning accommodation, medical treatment and
security of the Accused while on provisional release‖).
327. See Rearick, supra note 4, at 592–93 (noting that the ―Tutsi-dominated government
[of Rwanda] has no incentive to accept Hutu detainees for provisional release‖ and the
responsibilities of a host country discourage other countries from volunteering).
328. See, e.g., Carvajal, supra note 16.
329. Concededly, in some cases where defendants face extremely lengthy sentences, a
couple of years here or there may seem little incentive to behave.
330. E.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, & Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Decision on Motion for Provisional Release Filed by the Accused Hazim Delic, ¶ 3 (Int‘l
Crim.
Trib.
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia
Oct.
24,
1996),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tdec/en/61024PR2.htm.
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recently, the Dutch authorities have made it clear that their acquiescence to
provisional release of defendants is contingent on the defendants leaving
the Netherlands.331 The recent decision of the ICC‘s Appeals Chamber in
Bemba, which set aside the Pre-Trial Chamber‘s decision to release Bemba
and held that release could not be decided without specifying workable
arrangements, most importantly identifying a country willing to take the
defendant, 332 indicates that the Netherlands is not alone in its reluctance to
host international criminal defendants.333
Tribunals must seek to overcome the hostility of host and other countries
to absorbing, even temporarily, defendants accused of international crimes
who meet the standard for release. They should actively seek to make
arrangements with the host country to allow international defendants on
their territories outside of detention, preferably before the tribunals agree to
set up shop there.334 The tribunals should also make arrangements in
advance on the supervision of released defendants. The tribunal should
consider creating a division akin to pre-trial services in the United States
federal system that is charged with assisting domestic authorities in
monitoring released defendants. Should the Netherlands or other host
countries be unwilling to allow international criminal defendants on their
soil, at a bare minimum, international tribunals should negotiate
arrangements with other countries for release and supervision of defendants
before trial and during court breaks, much as they negotiate with countries
to take international defendants to serve their sentences.
CONCLUSION
Although the ICTY‘s limited release regime represents significant
progress over the mandatory detention regime of the post-World War II

331. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the
Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused Momir Talic, ¶ 38 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Sept. 20, 2002),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/20155759.htm (noting that the Dutch
authorities had informed the Trial Chamber that they had no objection to Talic‘s release as
long as he did not reside in the Netherlands thereafter).
332. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 OA 2, Judgment on the
appeal of the Prosecutor against Pre-Trial Chamber II‘s ―Decision on the Interim Release of
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo and Convening Hearings with the Kingdom of Belgium, the
Republic of Portugal, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Italian
Republic, and the Republic of South Africa‖, ¶ 90 (Int‘l Crim. Ct. Dec. 2, 2009),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc787666.pdf (holding that the Pre-Trial Chamber had
erred when it granted release without finding a state willing to take Bemba).
333. See id.
334. Unfortunately, it is too late for the ICC to negotiate such an agreement in advance.
ICC officials will have to do their best to negotiate with the Netherlands even though the
tribunal is now firmly entrenched there.
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tribunals, there remains room for improvement. For tribunals to achieve the
important goal of promoting respect for human rights, changes are
necessary.
The ICC appears to be moving in the right direction. The ICC rules have
tamped down on the ICTY‘s broad judicial discretion to deny release.335
ICC Pre-Trial Chambers, despite granting victims a voice in the decision,
thus far have been open to keeping defendants out of custody, at least
before trial, where there the grounds for detention are not met. 336 Finally,
the ICC also has provisions to compensate defendants if they are illegally
detained.
Nevertheless, the recent ICC Appeals Chamber decision in Bemba shows
that pressures on the tribunals to detain defendants remain strong. The
decision demonstrates that practical constraints not addressed in advance
may thwart ambitious human rights aims. Moreover, it remains to be seen
whether ICC defendants allowed to remain at liberty pre-trial will be
permitted to remain at liberty during their trials. The ICC should avoid the
ICTY‘s precedent whereby the standard for release and detention changes
as trial progresses. Finally, the ICC and other emerging tribunals, like the
Special Panel for Lebanon, would be well advised to consider in advance
the arrangements to be made for the release of a defendant for whom no
valid grounds for detention exist.

335. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
336. For example, the first defendant to voluntarily appear before the ICC on a
summons, Abu Garda, was never detained. He arrived at the court, and the ICC ―assigned‖
him a location where he should stay while he was in The Hague for his initial appearance.
Press Release, ICC, Confirmation of charges hearing in the case of The Prosecutor v. Bahr
Idriss Abu Garda scheduled to start on Monday, 12 October 2009 (May 19, 2009), available
at http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%
20cases/icc02050209/press%20release/confirmation%20of%20charges%20hearing%20in%
20the%20case%20of%20the%20prosecutor%20v_%20bahr%20idriss%20abu%20garda__i_
%20scheduled. The location remained confidential and ―[wa]s considered an extension of
the Court‘s premises.‖ Press Release, ICC, Bahr Idriss Abu Garda arrives at the premises of
the
Court
(May
17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/related%
20cases/icc02050209/press%20release/abu%20garda%20arrived%20at%20the%20premises
%20of%20the%20court. Abu Garda was ―ordered not to leave the premises of the Court
during his stay in The Netherlands without specific permission of the Chamber.‖ Id. After
the hearing, Abu Garda left the Netherlands. Press Release, ICC, supra.

